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Articles
“DOCILE BODIES” OR REBELLIOUS SPIRITS?:
ISSUES OF TIME AND POWER IN THE
WAIVER AND WITHDRAWAL OF DEATH
PENALTY APPEALS
Avi Brisman∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This past term, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in
the case of Baze v. Rees regarding the use of the tri-chemical “cocktail”
used to execute inmates on death row—sodium thiopental (also known
as sodium pentothal, an ultra-short acting barbiturate to render the
individual unconscious), pancuronium bromide (also known as Pavulon,
which causes muscle paralysis), and potassium chloride (to stop the
heart).1 In Baze, the petitioners neither challenged the constitutionality of
the use of lethal injection, in particular, nor the penalty of capital
punishment, as a whole. In fact, even if the Supreme Court had ruled in
favor of Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling, the two Kentucky inmates
∗
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; M.F.A., Pratt Institute; B.A., Oberlin
College. Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Alan S. Gold, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, and to the Honorable Ruth V. McGregor, then Vice Chief
Justice and currently Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court. An embryonic version of this
article was presented at the 35th Annual Conference, Western Society of Criminology, in
Sacramento, CA, on February 16, 2008. I am grateful to my copanelists and members of the
audience for their comments and questions. In addition, I would like to thank Samantha
Gottlieb for her insights and suggestions on an earlier version of this Article. Finally, I
would like to thank the following members of the Valparaiso University Law Review for
their assistance in preparing this Article for publication: Matthew Chandler, Carrie Flores,
and Melina Villalobos.
1
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527, 1532–153 (2008). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices
to Enter the Debate over Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24; Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A1; Gilbert
King, Cruel and Unusual History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A21; Adam Liptak,
Moratorium May Be Over, but Hardly the Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A26; Mark
Sherman, Supreme Court Upholds Use of Lethal Injections, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://a.abcnews.com/TheLaw/SCOTUS/wireStory?id=4664276; Editorial, The Death
Penalty Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at A26; Editorial, The Supreme Court Fine-Tunes
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A28. See generally Linda Greenhouse, After a 32-Year
Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A22;
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Already Split, Commence Work on a Polarizing New Docket, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A17; Elizabeth Weil, It’s Not Whether To Kill, but How, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2007, at WK3.
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who brought the challenge to the state’s lethal injection protocol, the
result would not have overturned their death sentences (or the sentence
of any other death row inmates for that matter).
The issue in the case was limited to the standard that courts use to
evaluate whether a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.2 What lay in the balance then was, at
most, a requirement that states employ a different method for carrying
out executions.3
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s method of
execution, holding that “[a] stay of execution may not be
granted . . . unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s
lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain[,]”
and that the petitioners had not established that the risks were “so
2
Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits
means for carrying out a method of execution that create an “‘unnecessary risk’ of pain” or
only a “‘substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture[,] or lingering
death.’” Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529; See also Greenhouse, Justices to Enter the Debate over Lethal
Injection, supra note 1, at A20; Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case,
supra note 1, at A1, A18; King, supra note 1, at A25; Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, but
Hardly the Challenges, supra note 1, at A18; Sherman, supra note 1; Editorial, The Supreme
Court Fine-Tunes Pain, supra note 1, at A26. See generally Mark Essig, This Is Going To Hurt,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at 415; Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens
Renounces Capital Punishment, supra note 1, at 24;. Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is
Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1; Kirk Semple, Judge Stays
Execution, Citing Case Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A24; Weil, supra note 1, at
WK3. In addition, the Supreme Court considered: 1) whether carrying out an execution
causes “unnecessary risk of pain and suffering” in violation of the Eighth Amendment
upon a showing that readily available alternatives that pose less risk of pain and suffering
could be used, and 2) whether continued use of the current three-drug “cocktail” violates
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because lethal
injections can be carried out using other chemicals that pose less risk of pain and suffering.
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1520. See generally Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens
Renounces Capital Punishment, supra note 1, at A20; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Stay
Execution, A Signal to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1; Greenhouse, Justices
Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, supra note 1, at A1, A18; Linda Greenhouse, Trying
to Decipher the Justices on the Current State of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at
A21; King, supra note 1, at A25; Editorial, The Supreme Court Fine-Tunes Pain, supra note 1, at
A26. See also Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, But Hardly the Challenges, supra note 1, at
A18; Sherman, supra note 1.
Note that the Supreme Court’s consideration of issues regarding execution methods,
rather than abolition, is consistent with the shift in public discourse about capital
punishment. See Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1265, 1266 (2001).
3
Ralph Blumenthal & Linda Greenhouse, Texas Planning New Execution Despite Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A1 (stating that “[e]ven if the Supreme Court rules in favor of
the two Kentucky inmates who brought the challenge to lethal injection, the result will not
be to overturn any death sentences, but rather, at the most, to require a different method to
carry them out.”). See also Essig, supra note 2, at 415; Weil, supra note 1, at WK3.
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substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment
violation.”4 Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his controlling opinion,
“Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by
accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish
the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as cruel and
unusual.”5 Despite this ruling, the potential impact of the case is still
quite broad and may well affect a category of death row inmates6 (in
what Michael Tonry refers to as a “window of opportunity”7) who often
fly beneath the public radar in death penalty cases.8
4
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534, 1537. See also Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in
Kentucky Case, supra note 1, at A1, A18; Sherman, supra note 1.
5
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531.
6
Some have suggested that the term, “‘death row’” inmate, is pejorative, preferring
instead “‘capital punishment’” (“CP”) inmate or “capital offenders.” George Lombardi,
Richard D. Sluder, & D. Wallace, Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates: The Missouri
Experience and Its Legal Significance, 61(2) FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (1997). See also Cunningham
& Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Review of
Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 191, 205 (2002). Such concerns notwithstanding—and
because “death row inmate” is still commonly used—this Article will use the terms “capital
offenders,” “capital punishment inmate,” “death row inmate,” “death-sentenced inmate,”
and “condemned prisoner” interchangeably.
7
MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL
CULTURE 94 (2004). Using Tonry’s formulation, Kudlac, for example, argued that
“declining support for capital punishment and DNA exonerations opened a ‘window of
opportunity’ that was followed by prohibitions on executing juveniles and the mentally
retarded and statewide moratoriums on executions.” CHRISTOPHER S. KUDLAC, PUBLIC
EXECUTIONS: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MEDIA 5 (2007). The suggestion here is that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Baze may affect the waiver and withdrawal of death penalty
appeals in the same way that DNA exonerations impacted capital punishment for juveniles
and the mentally retarded.
8
See, e.g., BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES 199–200
(2004). Forst continues,
[f]or decades the death penalty fight had been waged principally
on . . . ethical questions such as whether it is cruel and unusual (from
the left) or whether lesser punishments are unjust to the victims of
murder and their survivors (from the right), and empirical questions as
to whether it deters or brutalizes and whether it is applied in a
discriminatory manner, especially with regard to the races of the
defendant and the victim.
Id. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty,
17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 544 (2003). Garnett states,
the imposition of the death penalty raises a wide variety of challenging,
provocative, important, and perhaps more practical questions. For
example, does the death penalty deter crime? If so, do the “costs” of
capital punishment justify its deterrence “benefits?” How much
confidence should we have in the accuracy of the results of capital trials,
and how might we increase that confidence? How much appellate and
post-conviction review is necessary, appropriate, and feasible in capital
cases? To what extent, if at all, should American constitutional and
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Since Gregg v. Georgia9—the Supreme Court holding that paved the
way for the resumption of capital punishment in the United States10—
1,138 executions have been carried out, 131 of which have involved
“volunteers”11—individuals who waive or withdraw appeals at a point
criminal law relating to the death penalty reflect developments in
international law, and in the domestic laws of other countries? Are
death-eligible defendants provided with adequate legal representation?
Do prosecutors and jurors discriminate on the basis of race or sex in the
imposition of the death penalty? Does the United States Constitution
require that juries, not judges, make the decision for death, or that some
convicted murderers—say, those with severe developmental disabilities
or teenagers—be exempted categorically from execution? And so on.
Id. (footnote omitted); White, supra note 2, at 1267–68, 1270 (stating that “[f]or the most
part, recent discussions have focused on the reliability of the capital punishment system,
rather than whether the death penalty is right or wrong[,]” and observing that “[t]he
imperfections of America’s capital punishment system became real when Americans
learned that innocent people were being sentenced to death and executed for crimes they
did not commit.”).
For an illustration of which death penalty cases seem to attract (the most) public
attention, see, e.g., KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 5–8, 12–13, 65, 83, 145.
9
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
10
In 1972, following a five-year moratorium on executions, the United States Supreme
Court held in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that Georgia’s death penalty statute
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In
Gregg, the Court upheld Georgia’s newly-passed death penalty statute and ruled that the
death penalty did not always constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Gary Mark
Gilmore, executed by firing squad on January 17, 1977, and mentioned infra Parts III & IV,
was the first person put to death after Gregg. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). For
a brief overview of U.S. Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence from 1972–76 and the
relationship of Furman to Gregg, see White, supra note 2, at 1267 n.10.
11
Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2009) (providing death penalty statistics,
current as of Jan. 15, 2009). Note that “a significant proportion of defendants charged with
capital murder express a preference for a death sentence at some point during the course of
interactions with their attorneys.” Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1363, 1380 (1988). See also Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the inmate had “changed his mind about the desirability of post-conviction
relief at least eight times”); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86, 103 (Wash. 1992) (Utter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is common for those on death row to express a will to stop
their appeals and proceed with execution. Most change their minds and agree to continue
the appeals process.”); C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the
Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25(3) LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 849, 859 n.16, 862 n.17 (2000)
[hereinafter Harrington, A Community Divided]; C. Lee Harrington, Mental Competence and
End-of-Life Decision Making: Death Row Volunteering and Euthanasia, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 1109, 1109 (2004) [hereinafter Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision
Making]; Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 853–61
(1987).
For example, at various junctures in their respective criminal proceedings, both Aileen
Wuornos and Timothy McVeigh expressed preferences for the death sentence. See
KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 54–55, 63, and 103 (noting that Wuornos expressed a desire to be
executed on a number of occasions—April 1992, October 1994, and July 2001—but was not
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when viable claims still exist in their cases.12 “Volunteering” may seem
like an odd term to employ in the death penalty context,13 given that it
connotes second graders frantically waiving their hands in response to a
query from a teacher, do-gooders spending time at a Boys & Girls club,
or people picking up trash as part of an organized “Park Day” or
“Neighborhood Improvement Day.” Indeed, as Harrington writes: “[I]n
popular parlance[,] a volunteer is someone who dutifully and nobly
offers his or her time, energy, services, or body (in this case, quite
literally) for the common good—volunteering is socially praiseworthy.”14
But in the context of capital punishment, the term is used to refer to
individuals who have chosen to forego their appeals of death penalty
sentences and includes individuals who may hold vastly different
perspectives on death and the crime(s) for which they are to be
executed.15

executed until October 2002, and that McVeigh asked for his execution and indicated that
he would seek no appeals in December 2000—six months before the execution was carried
out). More recently, John A. Muhammad, who was convicted of sniper attacks in the
Washington area in 2002, wrote a letter to prosecutors requesting their help in putting an
end to his legal appeals from death row. Virginia: Sniper Asks To Stop Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2008, at A24.
Despite the fact that many defendants charged with capital murder express a
preference for a death sentence at some point during the course of their proceedings, most
capital defendants ultimately change their minds and choose not to volunteer. See Bonnie,
supra note 11, at 1388 (“Many capital defendants are ambivalent about their preferences
and vacillate as the trial process unfolds. In most cases, however, stable preferences
against execution eventually emerge.”); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at
850. See generally Ralph Blumenthal, After Hiatus, Setting a Wave of Executions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2008, at A1 (noting the ambivalence of Jack Henry Smith, 70, the oldest Texas
inmate on death row, who stated, “‘I’d hate to go before my time,’” but admitted that the
prospect of an end to his confinement might come as a relief).
12
See Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts
and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2005); Harrington, A Community Divided,
supra note 11, at 859 n.16; Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making,
supra note 11, at 1124; G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency,
Voluntariness, and Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861
(1983). Note that instances of “‘volunteering’” occurred before the reinstatement of the
death penalty in 1976. Id. at 861 n.8. Note also that “‘volunteer[ring]’” can refer to
individuals who argue for and attempt to procure the death penalty as a punishment from
the beginning of the criminal justice process. See Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1379–80. See also
Urofsky, M. I, A Right to Die: Termination of Court Appeals for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 553–82 (1984) (554–62, especially).
13
Sometimes “consensual executions” is used in lieu of “volunteering.” See Harrington,
A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850.
14
Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1122.
15
See David A. Davis, Capital Cases: When the Defendant Wants To Die, THE CHAMPION 45,
45–47 (June 1992); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 860; Harrington,
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1110–11.
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A number of medical anthropologists and sociologists have explored how death has
multiple meanings. For example, Margaret Lock, in her ethnographic inquiry into North
American and Japanese ontologies of death and the politics of organ transplants, asked
whether death is an event or a process, and stated that the concept of, and criteria for,
death are culturally determined:
professional consensus has been lacking as to whether death is a
moment or a process and how best to determine when it occurs. No
consensus exists even as to whether a definition of death should be
applicable to all living forms or whether there can be a death unique to
humans. . . .
....
. . . Clearly, death is not a self-evident phenomenon. The margins
between life and death are socially and culturally constructed, mobile,
multiple, and open to dispute and reformulation.
MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 7,
11 (2002). Similarly, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, another medical anthropologist comparing
brain death and organ transplantation in North America and Japan, maintains that “death
is always culturally defined even though it may be expressed in biological terms.” Emiko
Ohnuki-Tierney, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation: Cultural Bases of Medical Technology,
35 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 233, 235 (1994). And for Turner, a medical sociologist,
[t]here is a sense in which we can regard dying as the final process of
aging. Sociologists occasionally suggest that we can distinguish three
forms of dying, namely psychological, sociological[,] and biological
dying. As we grow old we are gradually marginalized within the
community and begin to lose a number of personal contacts, which
takes the form of a personal or psychological contraction (dying) from
social relations. Through the process of dying our social contacts are
gradually diminished and we find ourselves socially isolated. Finally,
this process is terminated by a biological death which brings to a
conclusion the long history of our personal disengagement. We can
therefore regard dying like aging as a gradual attrition of social
relations combined with increasing dependency often on institutions
which are somewhat anonymous and bureaucratic.
BRYAN S. TURNER, MEDICAL POWER AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 125 (2d ed. 1995).
For additional support for the proposition that death exists as both a biological fact
and cultural construct, see Stanley L. Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality in
the Assessment of Competence for Execution: A Response to Bonnie, 14(1) LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
91, 94–95 (1990) [hereinafter Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality]
(explaining that “some individuals view death as a brief sleep, after which they promptly
return, memories intact. Some view death as a time during which they leave their bodies
after which their astral selves will watch their friends with physical bodies. . . . These
perspectives emphasize the importance of evaluating how a condemned man’s view of
death influences his choice to be executed.”); STANLEY L. BRODSKY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADJUSTMENT AND WELL-BEING 252–53 (1988) [hereinafter BRODSKY, PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADJUSTMENT AND WELL-BEING]. Brodsky stated,
One more answer can be given to the question of why death
should be awaited with peaceful acceptance by some and with fierce
despair by others. It is because death has so many different meanings.
To some, death is a trigger, a stimulus that produces predictable
responses. Death may be understood as an event, a process that may be
a dramatic display or the quiet eye closing of beautiful actresses in
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In fact, it is partly because the intent of volunteers is so difficult to
discern that the issue has been so contentious.16 Some individuals
support an inmate’s right to personal autonomy and would permit
waiver or withdrawal of appeals provided that the courts are certain that
the inmate is neither depressed nor suicidal, nor in fact innocent or
legally ineligible for the death penalty. Thus, these proponents would
allow waiver or withdrawal of appeals by competent prisoners based on
procedural claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, improperly
excluded jurors, and prosecutorial misconduct.17 Others contend that
the debate should surround not the nature of the appeals, but the motive
of the competent inmate, whereby authentic acceptance of responsibility
is treated differently than a mere desire to escape the grueling conditions
of death row.18 Still, others argue that regardless of the nature of the
appeal or the motive of the inmate, a condemned inmate’s decision to
waive or withdraw his appeal should not be honored because the State’s
interests in preserving life, safeguarding the integrity of the proceedings
and the legal profession, and protecting the interests of the inmate’s
movies. How the state of death is approached affects the actual process
of dying.
Id.; ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES: SUFFERING, HEALING AND THE HUMAN
CONDITION 154 (1988) (discussing how each individual “must work out an appropriate and
desired way toward death” in contrast to the “mechanical models of the stages of dying”).
For a recent (counterintuitive) study finding that people become happier, rather than
distressed, when contemplating their own death, see G. Nathan DeWall & Roy F.
Baumeister, From Terror to Joy: Automatic Turning to Positive Affective Information Following
Mortality Salience, 18(11) PSYCHOL. SCI. 984, 984–90 (2007).
For a recent overview of how different cultures and societies regard suicide, see
Suicide: Elusive, but Not Always Unstoppable, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2007, at 63–64. See also
Benedict Carey, Making Sense of the Great Suicide Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at WK1,
WK8. Carey states,
An expression of true love or raw hatred, of purest faith or mortal sin, of
courageous loyalty or selfish cowardice: The act of suicide has meant
many things to many people through history, from the fifth-century
Christian martyrs to the Samurais’ hara-kiri to more recent literary
divas, Hemingway, Plath, Sexton.
....
. . . Suicide is an intimate, often impulsive decision that has defied
scientific understanding, just as it has confounded easy explanation
throughout history, or in literature.
Id. at WK1.
16
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Another Kind of Appeal From Death Row: Kill Me, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2007, at A14.
17
See infra Part III & IV. See also Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1390–91; Liptak, supra note 16,
at A14.
18
See infra Part III & IV. See also Stephen Blank, Killing Time: The Process of Waiving
Appeal the Michael Ross Death Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 735, 735–77 (2006); Liptak, supra
note 16, at A14.
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family far outweigh the inmate’s right to personal autonomy.19 And
finally, some claim that “competent” waiver or withdrawal is impossible
and that the expressed desire to forego appeals is an indication of the
inmate’s depression or suicidal ideation.20
Scholars and commentators have considered such issues as the legal
standard for waiver and withdrawal21 and the dilemmas it poses for
defense lawyers22 and mental health professionals (forensic clinicians);23
the nature of the claim the condemned wishes to waive or withdraw (i.e.,
substantive vs. procedural);24 the stage of the criminal justice process in
which the individual expresses a preference for a death sentence (i.e., at
trial vs. on appeal);25 and who may further appeal on behalf of an
incompetent prisoner (known as “next friend standing”).26 This Article
takes a different tack, building on Fair Fare?: Food as Contested Terrain in
U.S. Prisons and Jails, where this author used practices in prison as a lens
19
See infra Part III & IV. See also Strafer, supra note 12, at 895–908; White, supra note 11,
at 859.
20
See infra Part III & IV. See also Blank, supra note 18, at 764; Richard C. Dieter, Ethical
Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 799–820
(1990); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 849–881.
21
See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 735–77; Bonnie, supra note 12, at 1185–88; Harrington,
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1109–51; Strafer, supra
note 12, at 860, 876, 887.
22
Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious
Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67,
68–75 (Feb. 1990); Davis, supra note 15, at 45–47; Dieter, supra note 20, at 799–820;
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 849–881; Harrington, Mental Competence
and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1111; White, supra note 11, at 859–60.
According to Harrington, “[d]eath row volunteering . . . heightens the disjuncture
between the competing obligations of defense counsel to respect client autonomy and
protect client interests[;]” while “[v]olunteering raises similar ethical questions at all phases
of litigation but resolving them becomes more difficult with each progressive phase [and as
other issues are considered].” Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 855, 856,
868.
23
Compare Bonnie, supra note 22, at 75–90 (criticizing the arguments for abstention from
the capital sentencing process by mental health professionals), and Richard J. Bonnie,
Grounds for Professional Abstention in Capital Cases: A Reply to Brodsky, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 99, 99–102 (1990), with Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra
note 15, at 91–97.
24
Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1377–79.
25
Id. at 1389 (“If the trial court determines, after a suitable hearing, that the recalcitrant
defendant has expressed a rational and stable preference for a death sentence, the attorney
should be directed to comply with the defendant’s wishes regarding the presentation of
mitigating evidence.”).
26
See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 767–70; Paul F. Brown, Third Party Standing—“Next
Friends” as Enemies: Third Party Petitions for Capital Defendants Wishing to Waive Appeal, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 981, 981–1001 (1991); Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the
Death House: Third-Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201, 201–41
(1994).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/1

Brisman: "Docile Bodies" or Rebellious Spirits?: Issues of Time and Power

2009]

Death Penalty Appeals

467

with which to examine prison power nexuses and to challenge
conceptions of power relations in prison as simple, static, and
unidirectional.27 In this Article, waiver and withdrawal of death penalty
appeals serve as the domain through which meanings, identities, and
relations are defined and contested, and this Article attempts to set forth
a conceptual framework with which to understand these power
dynamics. Again relying on Wolf’s observation that “power balances
always shift and change, its work is never done; [and] it operates against
entropy[,]”28 the author of this Article argues, as he did in Fair Fare, that
power relations between the State and the condemned are not
unambiguous, straightforward, and imbalanced affairs. This Article
attempts to further an understanding of prison power relations in a
qualitatively and quantitatively different context29—for, after all, “the
penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed
under our system of criminal justice.”30
Part II of this Article briefly sketches some general characteristics of
death row inmates and provides an overview of the conditions of death
row confinement, including the impact of this environment on the
emotional, mental, physical, and psychological health of the condemned
prisoner.
With this foundation, Part III turns to a consideration of reasons
proffered for volunteering, ranging from guilt and remorse to
perceptions of justice and fairness to avoidance of death row conditions
to depression and suicidal urges to macho and hypermasculine notions
of pain and death. In so doing, Part III fleshes out the legal standard for
the waiver or withdrawal of death penalty appeals and contemplates the
argument that competent waiver is impossible in light of the experience
of death row conditions of confinement (a theory known as “Death Row
Syndrome” or “Death Row Phenomenon”), as well as the contentions
that waiver or withdrawal upholds the dignity and autonomy of the
prisoner.

Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 15(1) GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 49–93 (2008).
28
Eric R. Wolf, Distinguished Lecture: Facing Power, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 586, 590
(1990).
29
Recognizing, of course, that “power is a notoriously difficult, and highly contested,
variable (effect? intention?) to isolate for purposes of either social or ethnographic
analysis[.]” Mark Goodale, The Power of Right(s): Tracking Empires of Law and New Modes of
Social Resistance in Bolivia (and Elsewhere), in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING
LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 130, 146 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry,
Eds., 2007).
30
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion). See also McClellan, supra
note 26, at 241; White, supra note 11, at 863, 865.
27
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Part IV offers an analysis of waiver and withdrawal in light of
Foucauldian notions of discipline and bio-power, as well as Hardt and
Negri’s conception of the suicide bomber as an “opposite” of biopower.31 This Part considers the intent of the volunteer and the interests
of the State, and classifies the volunteer as either a “docile body” or a
“rebellious spirit” depending on his motivation(s) for waiver or
withdrawal and his “use” (or lack thereof) to the State. While Part IV
presents the options quite starkly—as if the only choices available are
“docile bodies” or “rebellious spirits”—the author of this Article does
not dismiss the possibility of a continuum. Rather, the goal is simply to
help address the larger question of who ultimately controls the body of
the condemned and to offer an instrument for exploring and
contemplating the continued rationale for the death penalty and the
purpose it may serve as a social phenomenon.
Part V of this Article by presents directions for future research in
light of Baze, the role of punishment in social life, and Foucauldian
notions of punishment and spectacle.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEATH ROW INMATES
AND CONDITIONS ON DEATH ROW
Death row inmates in the United States are predominantly male
(approximately 98.5%) and disproportionately Southern.32 More than
half are non-White—a percentage that far exceeds the racial composition
of the United States as a whole.33 Many suffer from neurological
abnormalities and neuropsychological deficiencies,34 as well as
psychological disorders.35
According to Cunningham and Vigen,
“[d]eath row inmates appear to have a disproportionate rate of serious
psychological disorders relative to a general prison population . . . .
ranging from maladaptive defenses to pervasive depression, mood

MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE
(2004).
32
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194, 206. See also Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty
for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, Through June 30, 2007 (2007),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FemDeathJune2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
33
See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 195–96, 206 (comparing the percentage of
African-Americans in the U.S. population as a whole—12.3%—to the percentage of
African-Americans on death row 42.72%); Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8,
2007). For a discussion of whether this comparison is meaningful, see Reuben M.
Greenberg, Race, the Criminal Justice System, and Community-Oriented Policing, 20 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 397, 397–404 (1997).
34
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 201, 206.
35
Id. at 200.
31

OF EMPIRE 44–45
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lability, and diminished mental acuity to episodic and chronic
psychosis.”36 In addition, those convicted of capital offenses frequently
have dysfunctional family histories (e.g., parental abuse, neglect,
abandonment, foster care, and parental substance abuse),37 and a
sizeable percentage report personal histories of substance
abuse/dependence,38 including alcohol and/or drug use at the time of
their crimes.39 As Burr expounds:
The defendant is typically limited in his or her ability to
live a productive, independent, law-abiding life. These
limits are imposed by a combination of problems:
mental illness, organic brain damage, mental
retardation, fetal alcohol syndrome, years of unrelenting
battering and abuse at the hand of parents or adult
caretakers, drug and alcohol dependence or, most
commonly, some combination of these disabilities.
When a violent crime is committed by a person who has
one or more of these disabilities, the disabilities have
necessarily contributed to that crime:
through
impairment of the ability to recognize or make
appropriate judgments about stressful situations and
about socially unacceptable behavior; through an
increased vulnerability to acting on the very strong
impulses that all of us have, but that most of us have a
way to modulate; through a diminished ability to
recognize the harmful effects of one’s behavior on other
people—to empathize; through a tendency to
misperceive situations as threatening or hostile when
they are really not; and finally, through a kind of
reflexive and almost unconscious resort to violence as a
way of coping with stress.40
With respect to intellectual ability and educational achievement,
although there are some instances of highly intelligent condemned
prisoners,41 most death row inmates have not graduated from high
Id.
Id. at 202, 206.
38
Id. at 201, 206.
39
Id.
40
Richard H. Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row: The Politics of Advocacy, 59
UMKC L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (footnote omitted).
41
For example, the first modern capital punishment case (1924) to receive a large
amount of media attention involved Nathaniel Leopold, 19, and Richard Loeb, 18, who
36
37
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school and possess IQs in the low-average-to-average range.42
Functional literacy levels of those on death row are frequently well
below what would be expected from the amount of schooling these
prisoners report receiving.43 Many border on mental retardation.44 As
such, Cunningham and Vigen assert that “the intellectual, literacy, and
psychological deficits of most death row inmates render them incapable
of responding to the demands of direct appeals or postconviction
proceedings without the assistance and representation of qualified legal
counsel.”45 This leads them to conclude the following:
[I]t is disturbing that so many inmates on death row are
so obviously damaged—developmentally, intellectually,
educationally, neurologically, and psychologically. To
the extent that the death penalty is intended to punish
those murderers who are most morally culpable, there
would seem to be some miscarriage of that intent when
it is visited upon individuals who are manifestly
damaged, deficient, or disturbed in their psychological
development and functioning.46
Such developmental, intellectual, educational, neurological, and
psychological limitations may be exacerbated by the particular adverse
conditions of death row incarceration.47 While variation in death row
were convicted of the murder of Jacob Franks. KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 26. Leopold, a law
student at the University of Chicago at the time of the crime, had an IQ over 200. Id. Loeb
was the youngest graduate ever of the University of Michigan and had an IQ over 160. Id.
Similarly, the serial killer, Ted Bundy, graduated with honors from the University of
Washington and briefly attended law school before devoting himself full-time to his
criminal career. Id. at 36–37.
42
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 199, 206. See generally R.J. Hernstein,
Criminogenic Traits, in CRIME 39, 49–53 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995)
(discussing the psychology of criminal behavior and the intelligence of offenders as a
whole and noting that “[a]fter sex and age, the single most firmly established psychological
fact about the population of offenders is that the distribution of their IQ scores differs from
that of the population at large. Instead of averaging 100, as the general population does,
offenders average about eight points lower.”).
43
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 199–200, 202, 206.
44
Id. at 206. Note, however, that in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme
Court held that the execution of persons with mental retardation is cruel and unusual
punishment and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
45
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 206. See also id. at 202.
46
Id. at 207.
47
Id. at 206. Note that unless an inmate is subjected to examination and evaluation prior
to confinement, it may be difficult to discern which symptoms and illnesses an individual
already has and which ones have been caused or exacerbated by death row conditions. See
generally TURNER, supra note 15, at 80 (stating that “[d]elusions and hallucinations[] . . . may
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confinement conditions and policies exists from state to state,48 and while
the experience of death row is unique to each individual,49 the death row
setting is typically described as austere, barbaric, and draconian.50
Inmates sentenced to death are frequently confined in separate areas of
prisons (hence the term, “death row”)51 and experience few
opportunities for exercise, rehabilitation, or even interaction with other
inmates.52 As Brodsky explains: “Living on death row is substantially
different from living in the prison population in general. . . . Death row
inmates typically have restricted opportunities for work, education,
recreation, visitation, worship, and friendships with other prisoners.”53
Similarly, Lombardi and his colleagues have found the following:
Capital punishment inmates were housed at a
belowground unit at JCCC [the Jefferson City
Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri]
completely segregated from the general inmate
population. With restrictions on movement and limited
access to programs, conditions of confinement for death
row inmates were similar to those found in other states.
Death row inmates did not leave their housing unit. All
services, including medical, recreation, food, and legal
materials, were brought to condemned prisoners.

occur in a wide range of cultural and subcultural contexts and especially under stress and
sensory deprivation . . . .”).
48
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194, 204. See also Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr. &
James H. Panton, Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 527, 531 (1975).
49
Gallemore & Panton, supra note 48, at 531 (stating that “the adjustment [to death row]
seems to be unique for each individual and not entirely predictable on the basis of
psychiatric diagnosis and previous behavior”).
50
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194 (noting the impact of “particularly
draconian conditions of incarceration” on inmates); Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3
(stating that “[f]rom early times, death row conditions were characterized by a pervasive
emphasis on rigid security, isolation, limited movement, and austere conditions[]”); Strafer,
supra note 12, at 869 (noting the “barbaric conditions pervading death rows and the
debilitating and life-negating effects of these conditions”).
51
Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3. See also Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A11.
Although according to one commentator, Texas’s death row is “hardly a row any more, but
an entire compound[,]” given that 360 men and 9 women await execution. Id.
52
Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007) (explaining that during their
years on death row, inmates “are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded from
prison educational and employment programs, and sharply restricted in terms of visitation
and exercise, spending as much as 23 hours a day alone in their cells”).
53
Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional, supra note 15, at 94.
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Inmates were permitted 1 hour of outside exercise each
day in a small, fenced area by the unit.54
While violence and the threat of violence in prison is a persistent and
pervasive problem contributing to inmate anxiety, depression, and
stress,55 most death row inmates—even those in facilities where deathsentenced prisoners are integrated into the general prison population—
do not behave violently.56 According to Cunningham and Vigen,
most death row inmates are engaged in direct appeals or
postconviction reviews of their death sentences, seeking
sentence commutation or new trials. As the outcome of
subsequent petitions and litigation might be influenced
by death row misconduct, inmates do have something to

Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 4. See also Blank, supra note 18, at 753 (explaining how
“[death row] inmates are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded from prison
educational and employment programs, and sharply restricted in terms of visitation and
exercise, spending as many as twenty-three hours a day alone in their cells”); JAMES W.
MARQUART, SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, AND JONATHAN R. SORENSEN, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR,
AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923–1990 138 (1994) (describing a
“dominance of security” on Texas’ death row, with twenty plus hours of cell confinement,
meals in cells, strict custody procedures, and restraints on out-of-cell movement). See also
McClellan, supra note 26, at 213–14 (describing the “lonely lives” of inmates on death row,
who usually do not mingle with the general population, spend most of their hours “‘locked
down[,]’” frequently eat their meals alone in their cells, and receive little exercise or
rehabilitation); Strafer, supra note 12, at 869–70 (describing how “death row inmates are
generally not integrated into the general prison population; have no access to
‘rehabilitative’ programs; have little opportunity to exercise; and are confined to their cells
for extraordinarily long periods of time”).
55
See, e.g., Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values:
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 283, 303–05 (2007). For a comparison between levels of violence in American
and Japanese prisons, see Norimitsu Onishi, As Japan Ages, Prisons Adapt to Going Gray,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at A1.
56
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 203 (“An expectation then that death row
inmates will invariably commit assaults in prison because they have ‘nothing to lose’
appears to be unfounded. . . . [T]he majority of death row inmates do not exhibit serious
violence within the structured context of institutional confinement.”). See also id. at 207;
Tad Friend, Dean of Death Row: The Man Who Became the Face of San Quentin, THE NEW
YORKER, July 30, 2007, at 62, 68; Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 7 (finding that “[t]he
majority of capital offenders are more easily managed with integration. Before the
integration program, [condemned] inmates had little to lose—outside of limited program
activities—for noncompliance with facility regulations.”); MARQUART ET AL., supra note 54,
at 181 (noting that most prisoners awaiting execution serve their time without major
incident).
54
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lose should they exhibit a pattern of recurrent
institutional violence.57
Nevertheless, many inmates experience death row as a “living
death”58 in large part because of the lengthy amount of time they spend
awaiting execution.59
To illustrate, consider Robert–François Damiens, the failed regicide,
whose gruesome execution is described in lurid detail by Michel
Foucault at the beginning of Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
Damiens’s unsuccessful assassination attempt of Louix XV of France
occurred on January 5, 1757; his execution took place just under two
months later on March 2, 1757.60
Similarly, the Death Penalty
Information Center explains that “[w]hen the [C]onstitution was written,
the time between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or
weeks.”61 In contrast, most death-sentenced inmates in the United States
today “languish for periods best measured in years as they await final
disposition of their cases in the appellate process.”62 Condemned
prisoners frequently spend over a decade awaiting execution.63 For
example, Cunningham and Vigen found that the eighty-five prisoners

57
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 32, at 203. Cunningham and Vigen also explain that
“[f]or some, the violent offense of conviction occurred in a particular context or at a
developmental stage that is not replicated in prison.” Id.
58
R. JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 17 (1981) (emphasis
omitted).
59
See generally Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 9.
Even where the conditions of death row are not so degrading as to
violate general cruel and unusual punishment norms, or result in
mental incompetency for execution, the very length of death row
confinement has been raised as an issue. Jurists have noted that
lengthy death row confinement might result in cruel and unusual
punishment.
Id. Cf. Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking Execution Trend, supra note 2, at A18
(describing how “Texas courts . . . speed the process along”).
60
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3 (Alan Sheridan,
trans., 1977).
61
Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007).
See generally Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “in cases tried at
common law[,] execution often followed fairly quickly after trial”).
62
Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3.
63
Blank, supra note 18, at 752–53. See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on
Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited
Dec. 8, 2007).
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executed in 2000 averaged 11.42 years between sentence and execution.64
For some prisoners, their time on death row exceeds twenty years.65
Part of the reason for the lag between sentence and execution (aside
from the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine, whereby a state
prisoner must exhaust all state judicial remedies to litigate federal claims
before a federal court will hear a petition for writ of habeas corpus66) is
that reforms intended to ensure the accuracy and thoroughness of
convictions and sentences have taken increasingly more time.67 For the
Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 195.
Blank, supra note 18, at 753. See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8,
2007). Tad Friend explains in his article that
[t]he public broadly endorses the [death] penalty—by about sixty-five
per cent in most polls—but many capital cases are beset by doubt,
mitigating circumstances, or evidence of the condemned’s remorse or
redemption. California has a particularly thorough appellate process,
and the result, on death row at San Quentin, is agonizing stasis: six
hundred and twenty-nine men, the nation’s largest assembly of the
condemned, now sit for an average of more than twenty-two years
before their sentence is carried out.
Friend, supra note 56, at 62, 68.
It is thus interesting to note that over the years, the amount of time that elapses
between commission of the crime and execution has increased, while the amount of time it
takes to execute an inmate has decreased. It used to be that individuals, such as Damiens,
see FOUCAULT, supra note 60, were tried quickly and the execution was prolonged. Now,
the final disposition takes years, but once the date of execution arrives, the goal is to kill the
inmate as quickly as possible. See Theo Emery, Tennessee, After Review, Sets Execution, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A19.
66
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000). Under the “total exhaustion” requirement of Rose v.
Lundy, federal district courts must dismiss “mixed petitions”—petitions containing both
unexhausted and exhausted claims—in their entirety. 455 U.S. 509, 520–22 (1982). In the
blunt words of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who authored the opinion for the Court, “our
interpretation of §§ 2254(b), (c) provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants:
before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to
state court.” Id. at 520.
See also Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359 (1988). Before presenting federal claims to a federal court in a
petition for habeas corpus, prisoners usually have to engage any state post conviction
procedures available after their convictions are affirmed on direct state appellate review.
Id.
67
See Blank, supra note 18, at 752. Blank explains,
In the wake of the Supreme Court-mandated suspension of the death
penalty from 1972 to 1976, numerous reforms have been introduced to
create a less arbitrary system, arbitrary referring to ensuring that the
process used to convict an inmate to death is accurate and thorough.
This has resulted in lengthier appeals, as mandatory sentencing reviews
have become the norm, and continual changes in laws and technology
have necessitated reexamination of individual sentences.
Id. (footnote omitted); Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007).
64
65
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most part, such measures have been welcomed.68 But, these efforts
geared towards rendering the criminal justice system less arbitrary have
prolonged the experience of living on death row.
Lombardi and his colleagues offer the following reminder: “outside
of occasional news stories about appeals, stays, or actual executions, little
attention is paid to death row prisoners themselves. Yet the capital
punishment process also involves confinement—commonly for years—as
inmates’ cases wind their way through the appellate system.”69 West
paints a more poignant picture: “Everyone must die, but only the
condemned prisoner is subjected to the terrible agony of prolonged
waiting—sometimes for years, tormented by hope—to be deliberately
slaughtered by a self-righteous society, while others, no different, are
allowed to live. This torture is harsher than the thumbscrew and rack.”70
But perhaps Blank offers the best assessment, suggesting that deathsentenced inmates who spend so much time awaiting execution actually
receive “two distinct punishments: the death sentence itself, and the
years of living in conditions tantamount to solitary confinement.”71
Indeed, the prolonged anticipation of death in a (relatively) known
manner at an uncertain time under the austere conditions described
above may be considered one of the most stressful of all human
experiences.72 As such, many death row inmates, especially those who
See
Death
Penalty
Information
Center,
Time
on
Death
Row,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007)
(contending that “[d]eath-penalty proponents and opponents alike say such careful review
is imperative when the stakes are life and death”).
69
Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added).
70
Louis Jolyon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 419, 421–22 (Hugo Adam Bedau and Chester M. Pierce, eds., 1975).
See generally Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A1, A11 (“Death is death[] . . . . If they stick a
needle in your arm or shoot you in the head, it’s cruel and inhuman punishment, taking a
human life. . . . [A] life sentence is a whole lot worse—it’s torture.” (quoting Jack Harry
Smith, 70, the oldest death row inmate in Texas) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
71
Blank, supra note 18, at 753. See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8,
2007) (asking “whether death row prisoners are receiving two distinct punishments: the
death sentence itself, and the years of living in conditions tantamount to solitary
confinement—a severe form of punishment that may be used only for very limited periods
for general-population prisoners”).
72
See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (declaring that “when a prisoner sentenced
by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence,
one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the
uncertainty during the whole of it”); Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (stating
that “the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be
comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself”) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting
denial of cert.); Blank, supra note 18, at 752; Gallemore & Panton, supra note 48, at 527, 531;
Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAW &
68
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enter prison with pre-existing (although not necessarily diagnosed)
emotional and psychological illnesses, suffer feelings of defeat, fear,
helplessness, lack of empathy and sympathy, loneliness, and
vulnerability, as well as mood swings, recurrent depression, and a
deterioration of mental and physical abilities, characterized by
confusion, drowsiness, forgetfulness, lethargy, listlessness, and mental
slowness.73 In this sense, the body of the criminal (as well as his mind

PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 141–92 (1979). See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8,
2007) (stating that “unlike general-population prisoners, even in solitary confinement,
death-row inmates live in a state of constant uncertainty over when they will be executed.
For some death row inmates, this isolation and anxiety results in a sharp deterioration in
their mental status.”); Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 814, 830 (1972) (“The tremendous mental strain of inexorably
approaching a foreordained death is unique to the condemned man. The imposition of this
strain violates society’s standard that a man should be treated with human dignity, and
robs the condemned prisoner of his own human dignity and psychological integrity.”)
(footnotes omitted); Strafer, supra note 12, at 867 (declaring that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a
source of psychological stress more exacting than being forced to live the spasmodic
certainty and uncertainty of being sentenced to die”); West, supra note 70, at 424 (stating
that “[d]eath sentences create a grisly reservoir of condemned persons living under
unbelievable stress in a situation . . . .[on] Death Row, organized and controlled in grim
caricature of a laboratory, the condemned prisoner’s personality is subjected to incredible
stress for prolonged periods of time”). See generally Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421
(1995) (“It is arguable that neither ground [retribution nor deterrence] retains any force for
prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death.”) (Stevens, J. opinion
respecting denial of cert.); Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366, 367 (1998) (maintaining that
“after such a delay [twenty-three years], an execution may well cease to serve the
legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a necessary constitutional
justification for the death penalty”) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Knight v.
Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 461–62 (1999) (stating that “[w]here a delay, measured in decades,
reflects the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that
time has rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one[,]” and contending
that “[i]t is difficult to deny the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution[]. . . .”)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Smith v. Arizona, 128 S. Ct. 466, 466 (2007)
(“Smith can reasonably claim that his execution at this late date [thirty years after
sentencing] would be ‘unusual.’ I am unaware of other executions that have taken place
after so long a delay[.]”) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
73
See Blank, supra note 18, at 746 (stating that “living under sentence of death can cause
an overwhelming sense of helplessness and fear”) (citing State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 593
(2005)); Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 204 (“Not surprisingly, there is evidence that
these bleak confinement conditions impact the psychological adjustment of death row
inmates—most of whom spend many years in this status.”); Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at
8 (“Overly oppressive physical conditions of death row may be detrimental to the inmate’s
mental health . . . .”); West, supra note 70, at 425 (“The strain of existence on Death Row is
very likely to produce behavioral aberrations ranging from malingering to acute psychotic
breaks.”). See also Blank, supra note 18, at 746 & n.61 (describing how “‘prisoners held in
segregated confinement frequently develop mental disturbances’ . . . .includ[ing] impaired
alertness, attention and concentration, hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, withdrawal,
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and soul) is “slowly destroyed as part of the legal system of revenge.”74
Contrary to Foucault’s contentions, the death sentence (albeit not the
execution, per se) has very much retained “those long processes in which
death [i]s both retarded by calculated interruptions and multiplied by a
series of successive attacks.”75
With this bleak backdrop, this Article now turns to a consideration of
the reasons proffered by inmates and commentators for the waiver or
withdrawal of death penalty appeals. While an exhaustive review is
outside the scope of this Article, Part III endeavors to provide a sufficient
survey of motivations for volunteering, as well as arguments for and
against allowing the waiver or withdrawal of appeals, in order to set the
framework for the discussion in Part IV of what these positions reveal
about the power dynamics between the State and the condemned
prisoner.
III. PURPORTED REASONS FOR VOLUNTEERING AND WHETHER COURTS
SHOULD PERMIT THE WAIVER OR WITHDRAWAL OF DEATH PENALTY
APPEALS
The general supposition in capital cases is that defendants wish to
avoid the death penalty.76 Indeed, as Davis contends, “Our system of
justice rests on two fundamental but rarely articulated assumptions.
Those who are alive want to remain so. When their interest in living is
threatened[,] they will fight to remain alive.”77 But as noted above, many
capital defendants, at various points in their criminal proceedings,
express a preference for death to the alternative of life in prison78—a
preference that, depending on the circumstances, may challenge State
control of the inmate’s body79 and State attempts to manipulate the
obsessive preoccupation with trivial matters, sleep disturbances and psychotic delirium”)
(citing Ross, 272 Conn. at 593); Johnson, supra note 72, at 141–92.
74
TURNER, supra note 15, at 34.
75
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 12.
76
White, supra note 11, at 853. See generally DeWall, supra note 15, at 984 (stating that
“[m]ost living things strive to continue living”); cf. McClellan, supra note 26, at 213 (stating
that “[d]eath-row inmates may have understandable motivations to actively seek the
imposition of presumably valid sentences”).
77
Davis, supra note 15, at 45.
78
See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text. See Harrington, A Community
Divided, supra note 11, at 861–62. According to Harrington, the decision to volunteer is
usually marked by some “precipitating factor . . . extraneous to the case[,]” such as “a
friend or family member has stopped visiting, the food or noise in the prison has gotten
particularly bad, relations between inmates have turned violent, and so forth.” Id.
79
See TURNER, supra note 15, at 17, 210. See generally J. Anthony Paredes and Elizabeth D.
Purdum, “Bye-bye Ted . . .”: Community Response in Florida to the Execution of Theodore Bundy,
6 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 9–11 (1990) (describing how “the governor [of Florida] and [Ted]
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meaning of death and suicide (or at least the conditions under which
death occurs).80

Bundy seemed locked together as mythic combatants” over whether and when Bundy
would die).
Because most defense attorneys will not accede to their clients’ requests to waive or
withdraw death penalty appeals, one could make the argument that the struggle for control
of the inmate’s body involves three players, rather than two—the State, the inmate, and the
defense attorney. See generally White, supra note 11, at 859–60 (describing efforts taken by
defense lawyers to circumvent inmates’ requests to “volunteer”).
80
See generally infra Part IV. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY:
AN INTRODUCTION, VOL. I 135–36, 139–40 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978)
(illustrating how “[f]or a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power
was the right to decide life and death. . . . The sovereign exercised his right of life only by
exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing[,]” but that starting in the
Seventeenth century, “[t]he old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now
carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of
life.”); HARDT & NEGRI, supra, note 31, at 20 (“Sovereign political power can never really
arrive at the pure production of death because it cannot afford to eliminate the life of its
subjects.”); LOCK, supra note 15, at 195 (suggesting that the “[s]udden and uncontrolled
death, and particularly accidental and violent death, death in childbirth, and suicide, raise
concerns about the condition of the social order”); TURNER, supra note 15, at 210 (describing
how
[w]ith technological change in the production and termination of life
processes, the state has become increasingly involved in the legal
dispute over the character of life—its origins, shape and destiny. To
some extent these conflicts raise at an acute political level the features
of modern patriarchy, since the state is now involved in the technical,
political and ideological battle over women’s bodies.
).
For French sociologist Emile Durkheim, who wrote the first case study of suicide,
suicide rates were a reflection of the state of a community or society. Rapidly increasing
rates of suicide were, according to Durkheim, symptomatic of the breakdown of the
collective conscience and social control. EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY
14–17 (John A. Spauling & George Simpson, trans., 1955) (1897); cf. JACK D. DOUGLAS, THE
SOCIAL MEANINGS OF SUICIDE 103–08 (1967). Following Durkheim, states thus have a
vested interest in the attitudes, meanings, perceptions, and rates of suicide. See generally
TURNER, supra note 15, at 179 (noting that “the state must attempt to preserve and promote
the general conditions of social harmony”).
For perspectives on the relationship of the State in Japan to the meaning of suicide, see
Chikako Ozawa-de Silva, Too Lonely to Die Alone: Internet Suicide Pacts and Existential
Suffering in Japan (under review with CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY) (referring to Japan as a
“‘suicide nation’ . . . due to the various forms of suicide that have gained prominence in
public attention,” describing the “popular Japanese discourse that suicide is one way that
individuals can assert their autonomy in a collectivist Japanese society,” claiming that
“[t]here has been a strong tendency in Japanese thought on suicide to blame society itself
and to look outside the actual individuals for the cause of suicide,” and explaining that
“[i]n Japan . . . certain suicides are given a positive cultural valence . . . . suicide is culturally
acceptable only under certain circumstances—when there is a clear reason for the person to
commit suicide according to cultural norms”) (manuscript on file with author); MAURICE
PINGUET, VOLUNTARY DEATH IN JAPAN 2–3 (1993) (explaining that “the essential point is
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A death row inmate may volunteer for execution for any number of
reasons. Some possess persistent guilt and sorrow about the crime or
crimes they committed.81 As Davis explains, “there are those who have a
profound, overpowering sense of guilt for what they have done, and for
them, their execution is the only way to not only expiate their sins but to
relieve them from the excruciating pain they are enduring.”82 Others
with even more guilt and an even more extreme need for expiation
“view death as the entrance into an eternity of torture, justly deserved
for their true sins.”83 In less radical ways, many express feelings of
“remorse” and stress the importance of “justice.”
For example, in Comer v. Stewart,84 the inmate explained that his
decision to withdraw his appeal grew out of a lengthy process of
introspection whereby he came to regret his actions, to recognize the
hurt he had caused many people in his life, and to accept and participate
in the punishment justice demanded for his crime.85 Acknowledging a
debt to the friends and family of his victim, as well as a desire to spare
his own family and friends ongoing pain, Comer declared: “I started
thinking about my victims, thinking about everything. It’s just time to
end it now. . . . I’ve been saying for a year—for, you know, the last
couple of years, at least, I killed this guy. . . . I stuck a gun in the guy’s
ear, pulled the trigger.”86 Comer did not express a true desire to die, nor
did he indicate support for the death penalty in general as a form of
punishment. But in his arguments to the district court, he indicated that
he wished to waive his appeals and expedite his death sentence because
he accepted the finality of his punishment87—reasons that the district
court found persuasive.88

that in Japan, there was never any objection in principle to the free choice of death—a
question on which Western ideology has always found it difficult to pronounce”).
81
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850.
82
Davis, supra note 15, at 46. See also Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at
850.
83
Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 94.
84
Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2002).
85
Id. at 1063.
86
Id. at 1063, 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Harrington, A
Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850.
87
Comer, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1061–72; Blank, supra 18, at 750–51.
88
Comer, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. On appeal, a divided three-judge panel for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that Comer had made a “free and deliberate choice” to die, but found that Comer’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated and held that Comer was entitled to a
new sentencing hearing. Comer v. Schirro, 463 F.3d 934, 948, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006). See
also Liptak, supra note 16, at A14. The Ninth Circuit then agreed to hear the case en banc,
Comer v. Stewart, 471 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 2006), and on rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
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In contrast, the death row inmate in Hamblen v. State expressed no
reservations about capital punishment as a matter of course.89 But like
Comer, Hamblen agreed with its imposition in his own case.90 Going
one step further than Comer, Hamblen, like other condemned prisoners
pressing for waiver or withdrawal, revealed that he did not want to
grow old in prison and no longer wished to live.91 In response to
Hamblen’s probation officer’s recommendation of life imprisonment
without hope of parole in order to provide the opportunity for reflection
upon the senselessness of his crime, Hamblen stated:
Mr. Chance [the probation officer] might have a valid
point if I were a young man with a whole lifetime ahead
of me and with a whole pocketful of hopes and
held that Comer’s pro se motion to waive further proceedings on habeas petition was
voluntary and valid. Comer, 480 F.3d at 960.
In reflecting on Comer’s case, it is worth considering the work of two anthropologists
working in Japan. In her observations about the effect of the Japanese psychotherapeutic
method of Naikan on its practitioners, Chikako Ozawa-de Silva writes that Naikan permits
one to engage in
a life-review enabl[ing] one to reflect on what kind of person one was in
life, and what one should have or could have done in the past; it is a
serious self-examination, which most people will have at one point in
their life. . . . Naikan is thus a preliminary facing of death, and, if done
deeply enough, actually eventuates an experience of fundamental
renewal, described by clients and practitioners as “rebirth.”
CHIKAKO OZAWA-DE SILVA, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND RELIGION IN JAPAN: THE JAPANESE
INTROSPECTION PRACTICE OF NAIKAN 27 (2006). Comer’s process of introspection, like that
of the Naikan practitioner, may have permitted him to comprehend his mistakes and
crimes. But with no opportunity to live differently (for had he not been executed, he still
would have spent his life in prison) and no occasion to make positive contributions as a
result of his new self-understanding and self-awareness, he was unable to feel renewal and
rebirth, leaving death as the only option.
Similarly, Dorinne K. Kondo, in her examination of the Rinri (Ethics) movement in
Japan and the creation of “ethics centers” (also referred to as “ethics retreats” or “ethics
schools”), explains that the purpose of such centers is to create “disciplined selves”—selves
possessing “sensitivity to social context and to the demands of social roles—not dogged
adherence to an ‘authentic,’ inner self to which one must be true, regardless of the situation
or the consequences for others.” DORINNE K. KONDO, CRAFTING SELVES: POWER, GENDER,
AND DISCOURSES OF IDENTITY IN A JAPANESE WORKPLACE 107–08 (1990). Comer’s extensive
self-reflection, combined with the austerity of prison, may have permitted him to transform
his “self,” much like the attendees of the ethics schools. But with no opportunity to build
on this transformation—with no opportunity to live differently, the way that ethics school
participants use their ethics experiences to “carry[] out [their] prescribed roles as dutiful
sons and daughters and as loyal, diligent workers.” Id. at 113. Comer may have felt that
death was the only real choice.
89
527 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1988).
90
Id.
91
Id. See also Davis, supra note, 15, at 46; Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note
11, at 850; White, supra note 11, at 861.
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dreams. . . . But, as a matter of fact, I’m 55, almost 56
years old and I don’t harbor any dreams that are going
to be realized in this world, and I am not particularly
given to reflection. Therefore, it seems to me that Mr.
Chance’s recommendation in this instance is
inappropriate and [the prosecutor] Mr. Bledsoe’s, on the
other hand, is appropriate.92
The trial judge considered Hamblen’s preference, reviewed the
record, including the psychological reports, and sentenced Hamblen to
death.93 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence
of death.94
Situations such as Comer’s and Hamblen’s present challenges to
courts, attorneys, and mental health professionals who must assess the
competency and voluntariness of waiver/withdrawal. The standard
used to determine whether an individual is competent to waive or
withdraw his death penalty appeals and forego any further legal
proceedings was first set forth in Rees v. Peyton.95 In Rees, the Supreme
Court indicated that courts must evaluate “whether [the prisoner] has
[the] capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with
respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other
hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect
which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”96 Since
Rees, some courts considering the issue of competence with respect to a
would-be volunteer have broken down the Rees standard into a series of
questions. For example, in Rumbaugh v. Procunier,97 the Fifth Circuit
interpreted the Rees test to require a death-eligible defendant to answer
the following:
(1) Is the person suffering from a mental disease or defect?
92
Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Davis, supra
note 15, at 46.
93
Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 802. A trial judge made this determination because Hamblen
had waived his right to have a jury consider whether he should be executed. Id. at 801.
Hamblen did not appeal his sentence, but the public defender’s office was appointed as
appellate counsel for Hamblen. Id. at 802. Hamblen moved to withdraw the appeal, but
his motion was denied. Id.
94
Id. at 805.
See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/searchable-database-executions (last visited Nov. 28,
2007). Hamblen was electrocuted on September 21, 1990. Id.
95
384 U.S. 312 (1966).
96
Id. at 314. See also Blank, supra note 18, at 738, 764–67; Harrington, Mental Competence
and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1113; McClellan, supra note 26, at 232.
97
753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985).
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(2) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect, does
that disease or defect prevent him from understanding his legal
position and the options available to him?
(3) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect which
does not prevent him from understanding his legal position and
the options available to him, does that disease or defect,
nevertheless, prevent him from making a rational choice among
his options?98
The Fifth Circuit continued:
If the answer to the first question is no, the court need go
no further, the person is competent. If both the first and
second questions are answered in the affirmative, the
person is incompetent and the third question need not
be addressed. If the first question is answered yes and
the second is answered no, the third question is
determinative; if yes, the person is incompetent, if no,
the person is competent.99
While some courts rely on “the actual Rees formulation,” rather than
breaking down the Rees standard into three questions,100 the point is that
a condemned prisoner may not waive or withdraw his appeals or
otherwise terminate his legal proceedings without a sufficient hearing to
ascertain his ability to make such a choice rationally. Despite this
safeguard,101 determining whether a death row inmate possesses the
98
Id. at 398. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a similar approach. See Lonchar v. Zant,
978 F.2d 637, 641–42 (11th Cir. 1992); Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322
(11th Cir. 2000).
For a brief overview of Rees and Rumbaugh, see Harrington, Mental Competence and
End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1113 n.5 and accompanying text; McClellan,
supra note 26, at 232–33; see also Strafer, supra note 12, at 876.
99
Rumbaugh, 753. F.2d at 398–99.
100
Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 888 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004).
101
According to some commentators, the Rees standard and permutations thereof are
inadequate. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 766, 770; Strafer, supra note 12, at 860–912.
One commentator claims:
The Rees test for competency[] . . . is unclear and subject to differing
interpretations. . . . The Rees test requires that the court find either that
the defendant lacks appreciation of defendant’s position and is unable
to make rational choices or that the defendant suffers from a mental
disease, disorder, or defect affecting capacity. Therefore, under Rees, if a
defendant suffers from a mental illness but makes seemingly rational
choices, the court still should find the defendant incompetent. In
contrast, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation[,] . . . the court could
find the same defendant competent.
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requisite competency is extremely difficult when the prisoner expresses a
desire to volunteer for execution because he can no longer tolerate the
dehumanizing conditions of most death row facilities, as described
above102 and as seen in the example of Hamblen, or experiences severe
depression or possesses pre-existing suicidal urges103 that nonetheless do
not prevent his “understanding his legal position and the options
available to him[.]”104 Establishing whether a prisoner has made a
knowing and intelligent waiver or withdrawal of his death penalty
appeals may prove particularly vexing when the prisoner expresses a
wish “to escape the roller-coaster experience of the habeas appeals
process or to seize control over it[,]”105 or indicates a desire for a “macho
confrontation with death.”106 While this latter proffered reason for
volunteering—the wish for a macho confrontation with death also
known as “the ‘blaze of glory’ syndrome”107—may seem odd and
unusual, Brodsky notes that “[t]hese beliefs are not rare; a small but
visible minority of condemned men hold them.”108 In fact, Gary Mark
Gilmore, noted above and discussed again in Part IV—the first
individual executed in the United States following the reinstatement of
McClellan, supra note 26, at 233 (footnotes omitted).
102
See supra Part II. See also Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850;
Strafer, supra note 12, at 873. Strafer argues that:
In a sense, the condemned have at their disposal an “easier” way to find
release from unbearable conditions [than dying patients]: they can
simply “pull the plug” by firing their attorneys and withdrawing their
appeals. Robert Lee Massie, for example, attempted to dismiss his
automatic appeal from a first degree murder conviction in California in
1979 primarily because he preferred execution to the extended torture of
life on San Quentin’s death row.
Strafer, supra note 102, at 873 (citing Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981)).
103
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850.
104
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
105
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850. See also Blank, supra note 18,
at 746 (explaining that “living under sentence of death can cause an overwhelming sense of
helplessness and fear resulting in a desperate need to regain control by waiving further
challenges to the death sentence”).
106
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850 (internal quotation marks
omitted). See Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 93
(discussing the hypothetical prisoner whose “primary underlying motive [for withdrawal
of appeals] is a deep commitment to toughness, to hypermasculine, adolescent beliefs that
the worth of a man lies in his tolerance of pain.”); Harrington, Mental Competence and Endof-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1133 (noting that some inmate’s “don’t want to be
perceived as wishy-washy or weak or cowardly” and that they want newspapers to report
“‘[i]nmate goes bravely to his death[]’”).
107
Strafer, supra note 12, at 875 n.56. See also McClellan, supra note 26, at 214-15.
108
Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 93. See also
McClellan, supra note 26, at 209; White, supra note 11, at 872.
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the death penalty after Gregg v. Georgia lifted the four-year moratorium
imposed by Furman v. Georgia in 1972109—was “intoxicated by the
prospect of [his] own punishment” and relished the publicity associated
with his volunteering and becoming the first person to be executed after
reinstatement.110
These reasons are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive: a
death row inmate may possess multiple motivations for wishing to
waive or withdraw his appeals and may emphasize one over another
depending on circumstances and the progress (or lack thereof) of his
proceedings. That a condemned prisoner’s grounds for volunteering
may be protean, making it difficult to discern his intent and his
competency,111 has led many people to argue that death row inmates
should not be permitted to waive or withdraw their appeals.
For example, although the United States Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that defendants who wish to waive or withdraw their
appeals are incompetent per se112—meaning that death row inmates who
volunteer are evaluated on an ad hoc basis under the standard set forth
in Rees—some contend that competent waiver is impossible given the
context of death row. According to White, who interviewed capital
defense attorneys regarding volunteering:
[Defense attorneys] often said that few, if any, capital
defendants are able to make a rational judgment about
whether they want to be executed. They pointed out
that many capital defendants have severe mental
problems and that they seem incapable of making firm
decisions about anything. Moreover, according to
defense attorneys, conditions on death row may often be
sufficiently debilitating as to impede the decisionmaking capacity of defendants who initially were
rational.113

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Jon Nordheimer, Death Wish Is Discerned In Poetry and Killings of Doomed Convict, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 15. See also KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 20–21.
111
See McClellan, supra note 26, at 235 (stating that “[t]he uncertainty of mental health
sciences and the impossibility of knowing with certainty what is going on inside someone’s
mind both contribute to the difficulty of determining competence”).
112
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312–13 (1979). See also Smith v. Armontrout, 812
F.2d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that “Rees clearly contemplates that competent
waivers are possible”); Blank, supra note 18, at 764; Harrington, A Community Divided, supra
note 11, at 852; McClellan, supra note 26, at 231.
113
White, supra note 11, at 858–59. See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life
Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1136 (stating that “[i]n the death row context[,]“ it is
109
110
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Similarly, Strafer contends that
decisions to “waive” further legal challenges can almost
invariably be traced to the unconscionable conditions to
which [the] condemned are subjected. Inmates are put
to the Hobson’s choice of prolonged torture by
incarceration or swift torture by execution. An inmate’s
“choice” of the latter alternative over the former is no
more voluntary than a confession beaten out of a police
suspect during a custodial interrogation; only the
method utilized to exact that “choice” is unique.
....
. . . [T]he “realities” of life on death row convey to
the prisoner such a resounding message that no “spoken
words” of coercion need be expressed. Through the
daily indignities both big and small, the near total
isolation which extends for years, the absence of
virtually all activities, and other brutal conditions, the
death row prisoner is “told” he is worthless and should
be and will be dead. The “choice” presented by the State
is to die now or continue to be punished for challenging
the State’s decision by the harsh regimes reigning on
death row.114
For Strafer, as with the capital defense lawyers interviewed by
White, the Rees standard is inadequate because it ignores the reality of
death row conditions and the impact that they likely have on the
individuals’ level of psychological stress.115 As Strafer concludes:
Stripped of the “psychological integrity” necessary to
make a fully rational decision, death row inmates
cannot, with any intellectual honesty, be considered to
be acting voluntarily when they demand their swift
executions.
....

possible that “poor prison conditions and the stress of life under a death sentence might
obviate the possibility of a rational choice to be executed”).
114
Strafer, supra note 12, at 863–88.
115
See id. at 863, 890. See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision
Making, supra note 11, at 1110 (explaining the position that “the dreadful living conditions
of most death row facilities, combined with the mental stress of living under a death
sentence, significantly alter inmates’ abilities to make rational life-and-death decisions”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 1

486

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Although prison conditions may not always render a
condemned inmate’s decision legally “involuntary,” the
ability of the inmate to make a truly autonomous
decision is nevertheless severely restricted by the prison
environment.116
Others take a less extreme approach, arguing not that competent
withdrawal is impossible (as a philosophical or psychological matter),
but that “the conditions and long stay on death row cause inmates to
lose mental competency and embrace death as an escape from death
row”117—often referred to as “Death Row Syndrome” or “Death Row
Phenomenon.”118 Although “Death Row Syndrome” or “Death Row
Phenomenon” are legal terms, rather than clinical ones, and have not
been recognized by the American Psychiatric Association (and do not
appear in its handbook, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”)),119 some international courts have recognized the

Strafer, supra note 12, at 892, 907.
Blank, supra note 18, at 737 n.12. See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on
Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited
Dec. 8, 2007); supra Part II.
118
Blank, supra note 18, at 737 n.12 and accompanying text, 738, 749–56; Death Penalty
Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007).
Schiffrin articulates “death row phenomenon” slightly differently, referring to it as
“the argument that prolonged detention on death row of itself constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.” Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 564–65
(1998).
Some mental health professionals refer to the “collection of psychological symptoms
experienced by inmates confined in cells with little social interaction or other sensory
stimulus, particularly for lengthy periods of time” as “‘SHU Syndrome’” (Segregated or
Supermax Housing Unit Syndrome). Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 n.18 (D.
Ariz. 2002). See also David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 98–103 (January 1998). These symptoms have also been
characterized by mental health professionals as “Ad Seg Syndrome or Reduced
Environmental Stimulus Syndrome (‘RES Syndrome’).” Comer, 230 F.Supp.2d at 1025 n.18;
Nan D. Miller, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary Confinement in the
United States a Violation of International Standards? 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139, 162–69 (1995);
Sally Mann Romano, If the SHU Fits: Cruel and Unusual Punishment at California’s Pelican
Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1110 n.124 and accompanying text, 1119 n.173 and
accompanying text, 1132 nn.261–62 and accompanying text, 1133 n.269 and accompanying
text (1996).
119
Blank, supra note 18, at 752 nn.100–01 and accompanying text (citing David WallaceWells, What Is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came up with It?, Slate (Feb. 1, 2005), available
at http://www.slate.com/id/2112901/).
116
117
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syndrome or phenomenon as grounds for refusing extradition,120 as well
as for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment.121
Not everyone believes that competent withdrawal is impossible or
that those on death row who wish to waive or withdraw their appeals
suffer from “Death Row Syndrome.” In fact, some contend that
volunteering permits condemned prisoners to uphold their dignity,
autonomy, and self-esteem by recognizing them as adults able to make
their own independent decisions.122 For example, Bonnie argues as
follows:
A convicted prisoner does not become a pawn of the
state. Even a prisoner sentenced to death retains a
constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy—of
belief, expression, and, to a limited extent, action. The
state is bound to respect a convicted prisoner’s
inalienable freedom of conscience. He is free to admit
his guilt and to repent, just as he is free to proclaim his
innocence in defiance of the verdict under which he
stands convicted. He is free to resign himself to the
social decree, acknowledging the justice of the
punishment, just as he is free to decry it.
A condemned prisoner may believe that the
sentence of death is justly deserved and should be
carried out, notwithstanding the existence of doubts
about its validity. A condemned prisoner may prefer
the unknowable fate of execution to the known pains of
imprisonment, the only option likely to be available. As
long as the prisoner is competent to make an informed

Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 EUR. HUM. RTS. REV. 439 (1989); Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989). See also Blank, supra note 18, at 753–55; Death
Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007).
But see Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991, reported at 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993). In
Kindler v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court did not refuse extradition based on the
possibility that the defendant could be subject to Death Row Syndrome. Id. See also Blank,
supra note 18, at 755.
121
See Pratt and Morgan v. Jam., Commc’n Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 (views adopted Apr.
7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986; Earl Pratt and Another
Appellant v. Attorney General for Jamaica and Another Respondents, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 1993
WL 963003, at *35–36 (P.C.) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica); Pratt v.
Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22. See also Blank, supra note 18, at 754–55;
Schiffrin, supra note 118, at 563–68.
122
For a discussion of the difference between “choice” and “autonomy,” see SUSAN
ORPETT LONG, FINAL DAYS: JAPANESE CULTURE AND CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE 6 (2005).
120
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and rational choice, the argument for respecting this
choice would appear to be a powerful one.123
While Bonnie endorses measures taken by courts to ensure that
death row inmates are competent to make decisions about volunteering,
he rejects the categorical view that condemned prisoners are incapable of
exercising voluntary choice.124 For him, “[t]he view that the decisions of
death penalty defendants or death-row inmates are never competent or
voluntary undermines respect for the prisoner’s autonomy while
pretending to honor it.”125 Elsewhere he writes: “To ignore the
prisoner’s preference in all cases, on grounds of ‘soft paternalism,’
undermines the principle of autonomy by pretending to respect it. . . . I
would not demean the dignity of the condemned as a price for society’s
failure to abolish the death penalty.”126
Bonnie’s contention that volunteering permits the condemned
prisoner to uphold his dignity, autonomy, and self-esteem resonates
with the findings of medical anthropologists, medical sociologists, and
psychiatrists dealing more broadly with issues of choice and death. For
example, Susan Long in her exegesis on bioethics and end-of-life
decision making in Japan, notes that “how to die has been added to the
realm of what we can choose”127 and that the conscious construction of
self occurs through the choices we make.128 Similarly, Ohnuki-Tierney,
in her cross-cultural comparison of brain death and organ
transplantation, writes:
[T]he body is essential to the life and death of a person
and to personhood.
....
For the self-identity of individuals in all cultures, the
body holds intense emotional power. The existential
seat of personhood is the body. “I” is experienced
through “my body” in relationship to others and their
bodies.129
While Ohnuki-Tierney’s observations would likely be met favorably
by many individuals not on death row, one could well argue that they
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
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Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1376. See also Bonnie, supra note 22, at 72–73.
Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1375 n.31.
Id.
Bonnie, supra note 23, at 102.
LONG, supra note 122, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 15, at 236, 240.
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have special relevance to the condemned prisoner whose body, as noted
in Part II, is highly regulated and subjected to control by the State, and
whose “[c]hoices are constrained by what is possible in [his] given
environment[.]”130 His experience of “I” or sense of self is wrapped up
in a body in relationship to others—just like that of a non-incarcerated
person. But he may regard State management and restriction of his body
in all facets of his life as an infringement on his personhood, and thus
consider volunteering as an (perhaps the only) opportunity to (again)
experience himself as an “existential self,” rather than an “animated
machine”131 or “depersonalized thing[.]”132
In a similar vein, Ozawa-de Silva, writing about internet suicide
pacts in Japan, argues: “to prevent suicide is to cruelly deprive
individuals of one of the few, free, important acts an individual can
make in an extremely conformist society.”133 Extending her ideas to the
arena of volunteering, one could maintain that to prevent waiver or
withdrawal of death penalty appeals is to cruelly deprive individuals of
one of the few, free, important acts an individual can make in the hyperconformist prison society.
This Article will return to the intersection of agency and autonomy,
volunteering, and suicide later in Part IV. But first, this Article sets forth
a classificatory model for how one might consider the death row
volunteer in light of State perspectives on, and the inmate’s expressed
motivations for, waiver or withdrawal.
IV. DOCILE BODIES OR REBELLIOUS SPIRITS?: THE INTENT OF THE
VOLUNTEER (AND WHETHER IT MATTERS), THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE,
AND WHAT THIS MAY REVEAL ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Docile Bodies
At the beginning of Discipline and Punish, and as noted above in Part
II, Foucault describes the execution of Damiens and the transition from

LONG, supra note 122, at 10.
CECIL G. HELMAN, CULTURE, HEALTH AND ILLNESS: AN INTRODUCTION FOR HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 81 (1994).
132
TURNER, supra note 15, at 76.
133
Ozawa-de Silva, supra note 80. For an in-depth argument of the “right to suicide,” see
THOMAS SZASZ, FATAL FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF SUICIDE (1999); THOMAS
SZASZ, MY MADNESS SAVED ME: THE MADNESS AND MARRIAGE OF VIRGINIA WOOLF (2006).
See also TURNER, supra note 15, at 77–78 (discussing Szasz’s “anti-psychiatry” and positions
with respect to the freedom to choose, the right of the patient to resist forced treatment, and
his strident opposition to the insanity plea in criminal cases).
130
131
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punishment aimed at the body to punishment aimed towards the soul.134
Such a shift occurred, in part, to transform criminals in order to make
them “docile” or useful135—“useful” in the sense of functioning and
promoting the new economics (e.g., factories) and politics (e.g., military
organization and warfare) of the modern industrial age.136 But what
would a “docile” or “useful” body be in the context of the death penalty?
Foucault is less than explicit in this sense—in part because the death
penalty was on the wane at the time of his writing (the last execution in
France occurred in 1977 and it was officially outlawed in 1981).137
One could argue that a “docile body” in the death penalty context
refers to the volunteer—the “pliant mind”138—the individual who “rolls
over” and allows the State to carry out its sentence (in contrast to the
death row inmate who continues to fight his sentence). This would
appear to constitute a reconceptualization of Foucault’s notion of “docile
bodies” and would appear to treat “docility” in normative terms139
because a dead body is not particularly “useful” in the Foucauldian
sense (i.e., in terms of promoting efficiency in factories, military
regiments, and school classrooms). Or so it would appear.
According to Foucault, in the nineteenth century, crime became
not a potentiality that interests or passions have
inscribed in the hearts of all men, but that it [became]
almost exclusively committed by a certain social class;
that criminals, who were once to be met with in every

FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 3, 31. See also NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT
WEEPING: THE VIOLENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRAZIL 220–21 (1992). See generally Anton
Blok, The Symbolic Vocabulary of Public Executions, in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF
LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31, 46–47, 51 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier,
eds., 1989).
135
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 135, 70, 69. See also FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 139–41;
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 136
(1990); John O’Neill, The Disciplinary Society: From Weber to Foucault, 37 BRITISH JOURNAL
OF SOCIOLOGY 42, 42–43, 54 (1986); OZAWA-DE SILVA, supra note 88, at 33; Nancy ScheperHughes & Margaret M. Lock, The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical
Anthropology, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 6, 8 (1987); TURNER, supra note 15, at 34.
136
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 135–69. See also GARLAND, supra note 135, at 131–55.
137
See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 137–38; MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER: ESSENTIAL
WORKS OF FOUCAULT 459–61 (James D. Faubion, ed., Robert Hurley, et al. trans., 1994).
138
Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 135, at 8.
139
As an example of “‘docility’” in normative terms, consider Strafer’s comment that
“[i]n the extermination camps of Nazi Germany, prisoners were repressed into ‘docility’ to
the point where they ‘walked to the gas chambers or . . . dug their own graves and then
lined up before them so that, shot down, they would fall into the graves.’” Strafer, supra
note 12, at 872 n.46 (quoting B. BETTLEHEIM, THE INFORMED HEART 250 (1960)).
134
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social class, now emerged almost all from the bottom
rank of the social order.140
Foucault continues that not only has prison failed to eliminate crime, but
that
prison has succeeded extremely well in producing
delinquency, a specific type, a politically or
economically less dangerous—and, on occasion,
usable—form of illegality; in producing delinquents, in
an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally supervised
milieu; in producing the delinquent as a pathologized
subject.
....
. . . . Because the prison facilitates the supervision of
individuals when they are released, because it makes
possible the recruiting of informers and multiplies
mutual denunciations, because it brings offenders into
contact with one another, it precipitates the organization
of a delinquent milieu, closed in upon itself, but easily
supervised: and all the results of non-rehabilitation
(unemployment, prohibitions on residence, enforced
residences, probation) make it all too easy for former
prisoners to carry out the tasks assigned to them. Prison
and police form a twin mechanism; together they assure
in the whole field of illegalities the differentiation,
isolation[,] and use of delinquency. In the illegalities,
the police-prison system segments a manipulable
delinquency. This delinquency, with its specificity, is a
result of the system; but it also becomes a part and an
instrument of it. So that one should speak of an
ensemble whose three terms (police—prison—
delinquency) support one another and form a circuit
that is never interrupted. Police surveillance provides
the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms
into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police
supervisions, which regularly send back a certain
number of them to prison.141

140
141

FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 275.
Id. at 277, 281–82.
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As Garland explains, Foucault makes the “argument that the
creation of delinquency is useful in a strategy of political domination
because it works to separate crime from politics, to divide the working
classes against themselves, to enhance the fear of prison, and to
guarantee the authority and powers of the police.”142
Extending this avenue of inquiry, one could argue that the death
penalty thus functions as a supreme example or reminder of the
undesirability of prison and “the authority and powers of the police”—
what Paredes and Purdum refer to as the “validation-of-law
hypothesis[.]”143 For them,
capital punishment in contemporary America functions
as the ultimate validator of law, serving “to reassure
many that society is not out of control after all, that the
majesty of the Law reigns, and that God is indeed in his
heaven”, [sic] in much the same way the Aztec rituals
reassured the population that the state was healthy and
the Sun would remain in the heavens.144
As they explain, “many do take special comfort in the affirmation of
authority and order which capital punishment seems to provide—
especially when the executed is such a vile smart-aleck as the likes of Ted
Bundy.”145 Following this line of thinking, one could maintain that the
“docile body” is the body that is used by the State to flex its muscle when
need be.
But if this is the case—if the death row inmate really is a “docile
body”—what is the significance of “volunteering”? If the State has
retained the death penalty in order to promote its strength and power
when needed, then does it matter whether the prisoner fights the State
(by fighting his sentence) or not? Again, one might be tempted to argue
that a situation where the “volunteer” rolls over—gives up because he
does not wish to grow old in prison because he can no longer stand the
GARLAND, supra note 135, at 149–50. See FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 264–92.
Paredes & Purdum, supra note 79, at 9.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 11. See also J. Anthony Paredes, Capital Punishment in the USA, 9 ANTHROPOLOGY
TODAY 16, 16 (1993). Paredes states,
capital punishment in America promotes confidence in the existing
social order and is an institutionalized magical response to perceived
disorder. . . . [M]any Americans cling to the hope that by ritually
executing an occasional murderer (from among thousands)[,] order will
be restored as surely as collectively sanctioned killing of a threatening
deviant restored social harmony in the (imagined) tribal or frontier or
agrarian or small town or old neighbourhood past.
142
143
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conditions of death row—is desired by the State. This is a “super-docile”
or “super-useful” body—it shows the power of the State not only over
the body (in the sense of corporeal death), but also over the soul and will
of the prisoner to live. While some claim that the State wants death row
inmates to volunteer,146 most courts and commentators suggest the
opposite—that the State, consistent with its desire to dictate the meaning
of death and suicide and the circumstances under which death occurs, 147
does not favor waiver or withdrawal.
First and foremost, and as noted above, the State has an interest in
the preservation of life and the prevention of suicide148—an interest that
does not end once an individual is sentenced to prison or death.149 In
fact, courts have been particularly sensitive to the “self-destructive
motivations”150 of volunteers and have taken measures and explicitly
expressed the desire to avoid complicity in state-assisted suicide.151 Even

Id.
146
See Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 864 (stating that “[m]ost
attorneys believe the courts are more than willing to set a speedy execution date for
inmates claiming to want one even if the desire is not sustained”). See generally Harrington,
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1130, 1133 (noting that
the attorneys he studied “believe the national pro-death penalty climate shapes how courts
frame the meaning of elected executions (i.e., as freely made expressions of inmate
autonomy) and thus how they respond to inmates wishing to waive postconviction
appeals[,]” and that attorneys “fear the courts strategically construct decisions to waive
appeals as a competent exercise of inmate autonomy[;]” and thus, they conclude that
“[a]llowing inmates to volunteer, . . . both confirms and perpetuates the pro-death penalty
climate in the United States.”).
147
See supra Part III.
148
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 864; McClellan, supra note 26, at
215; Strafer, supra note 12, at 896, 903.
149
For example, the state is permitted to force-feed a hunger-striking prisoner. See
Brisman, supra note 27, at 86; McClellan, supra note 26, at 215.
150
George F. Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 432, 433 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce, eds.,
1975).
151
Whitemore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 172 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A]
wrongful execution is an affront to society as a whole”); Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725,
726 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s granting of a
motion by a pro se death-row inmate to withdraw his petition for review with the Supreme
Court on the grounds that the Court’s actions constituted an approval of “‘stateadministered suicide’”); Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1103 (1981) (prohibiting the defendant from waiving review of his death sentence on
the grounds that “[t]he state of California has a strong interest in the accuracy and fairness
of all its criminal proceedings”); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978)
(explaining that “the waiver concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal
defendant to choose his own sentence. Especially is this so where, as here, to do so would
result in state aided suicide.”); Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 811 (Okla. 1993) (Chapel, J.,
specially concurring). The court stated that
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in situations where courts have permitted waiver or withdrawal—such
as in Hamblen—courts have recognized “the friction between an
individual’s right to control his destiny and society’s duty to see that
executions do not become a vehicle by which a person could commit
suicide.”152
Part of this heightened concern stems from the “murder/suicide
phenomena” that is often present in death penalty cases in general and
waiver and withdrawal cases in particular.153 According to Strafer,
“[t]he ‘murder/suicide’ phenomenon refers to the clinically recognized
syndrome in which an individual intentionally commits murder in a
state with a death penalty hoping that, once caught, the State will
execute him and thereby accomplish what he himself cannot bring about
by his own hand.”154
At first blush, this might seem like an odd reason to commit murder
and thus a rare occurrence in United States death penalty jurisprudence.
But according to Strafer, “the impulse to murder is often preceded by a
history of failed attempts at suicide.”155 This was the case in People v.

the State of Oklahoma has a keen interest in assuring that its system of
justice is not being manipulated or abused by a defendant. The State
must not become an unwitting partner in a defendant’s suicide by
placing the personal desires of the defendant above the societal
interests in assuring that the death penalty is imposed in a rational,
non-arbitrary fashion.
Id. See generally Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811–12 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from decision denying stay of execution) (reasoning that “[b]y refusing to
pursue his Eighth Amendment claim, Bishop has, in effect, sought the State’s assistance in
committing suicide”).
Compare C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 875 (noting that
“[t]he legal literature refers to volunteering as state-assisted suicide, a phrase defense
attorneys suggest has two meanings—that the state actually performs the killing through
executions and that the state provides an impetus or ‘shove’ toward suicide[,]” and
suggesting that the more appropriate term might be “client-assisted homicide.”), with
Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1363, 1375 (
The prisoner’s interest in controlling his own fate is often denigrated
by proponents of aggressive judicial review as amounting to nothing
more than ‘state-administered suicide.’ This is hyperbole, of course;
only if execution of a lawfully imposed death sentence amounts to
homicide is the state an agent of suicide when it executes a competent
prisoner who has declined to contest his death sentence.
) (footnote omitted), and Bonnie, supra note 22, at 72 (same).
152
Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1988).
153
Strafer, supra note 12, at 863.
154
Id. at 863 n.12.
155
Id. at 865. According to Strafer, “decisions to plead guilty or waive post-conviction
remedies in capital cases . . . . reflect either the intentional death wish of the condemned, as
in the ‘murder/suicide’ phenomenon, or the synergistic effect of the panic attendant to the
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Cash, where the defendant, having twice attempted suicide,
unsuccessfully, and unable to determine the method for his third try,
“decided that if he killed [someone] the State would take his life.”156
Similarly, White offers the following commentary:
Psychiatrists have long recognized that some killers’
motivation for killing is to bring about their own
execution. . . . [T]his motivation may be unconscious
and impossible to establish with scientific certainty. In
others, however, the killer’s desire to be executed may
be conscious. Psychiatrists have documented cases in
which killers have openly stated that their reason for
killing was to have the state execute them.157
Likewise, McClellan notes:
Frequently, persons who seek the death penalty are
suicidal individuals who killed expressly for the
purpose of getting the death penalty—the so-called
“murder-suicide” syndrome. . . .
[Some condemned
prisoners] may have killed because they wanted the
state to end their lives. Execution then becomes stateassisted suicide. For people with suicidal tendencies,

anticipation of death by execution accompanied by continued existence in the insufferable
environs of death row.” Id. at 875.
156
People v. Cash, 345 P.2d 462, 463 (Cal. 1959). See also Strafer, supra note 12, at 865.
Like Cash, James D. French, the last person executed in Oklahoma prior to Furman v.
Georgia and the only person executed in the United States in 1966, had seriously attempted
suicide several times prior to killing his cellmate (after having received a life sentence for
murdering a motorist). See Katherine van Wormer, Execution-Inspired Murder a Form of
Suicide?, 22 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 1, 1–10 (1995); West, supra note 70, at 419, 426–27. As West
explains:
[d]uring a psychiatric examination in 1965, French admitted to me that
he had seriously attempted suicide several times in the past but always
“chickened out” at the last minute. His basic (and obviously
abnormal) motive in murdering his inoffensive cellmate was to force
the State to deliver to him the electrocution to which he felt entitled
and which he deeply desired. French was the only man who was
executed in the United States during 1966. He had successfully forced
the State of Oklahoma to fulfill its contract to reward murder with
murder. If Oklahoma had not had the death penalty, it is likely that
both of the men murdered by James French would still be alive.
West, supra note 70, at 427. See also White, supra note 11, at 874–75.
157
White, supra note 11, at 874 (footnote omitted).
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therefore, the death penalty may actually encourage
murder.158
The idea that the death penalty may actually encourage murder
resonates with West, who writing in the mid-1970s, states:
I am convinced that there is an even more specific way
in which the death penalty breeds murder. It becomes
more than a symbol. It becomes a promise, a contract, a
covenant between society and certain (by no means rare)
warped mentalities who are moved to kill as part of a
self-destructive urge. These murders are discovered by
the psychiatric examiner to be, consciously or
unconsciously, perpetrated in an attempt to commit
suicide by committing homicide. It only works if the
perpetrator believes he will be executed for his crime. I
believe this to be a significant reason for the tendency to
find proportionally more homicides in death penalty
states than in those without it. I even know of cases
where the murderer left an abolitionist state deliberately
to commit a meaningless murder in an executionist state,
in the hope thereby of forcing society to destroy him.159
Although West’s contentions predate Gilmore’s volunteering and
execution, the statements could easily apply to him: after serving
sentences in Oregon and Illinois for robbery and assault, Gilmore was
paroled and decided to relocate to Utah—a state that, at the time,
employed the firing squad as its method of execution—rather than
158
Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death House: Third-Party Standing in DeathRow Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201, 214 (1994) (footnotes omitted). As McClellan
further explains,
[w]hen death-row inmates volunteer for execution, the state
becomes a vehicle for fulfilling their suicidal desires. . . . The courts
allow waiver of counsel under the guise of preserving defendants’
autonomy. At some point, inmates’ interests in ending protracted
appellate review of their cases may override third-party interests.
However, defendants may be choosing their sentences by manipulating
the judicial system: confessing to the crime; not cooperating with or
firing attorneys; not presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing; and
waiving appeals.
Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
For an early discussion of the “murder-suicide” phenomenon (although the term itself
is not used), see Robert Fletcher, The New School of Criminal Anthropology, 4 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 201, 216 (1891).
159
West, supra note 70, at 419, 426 (citation omitted).
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return to his home state of Oregon, which had no death penalty.160
According to Dr. John C. Woods, chief of forensic psychiatry at Utah
State Hospital and one of the psychiatrists who examined Gilmore before
his trial,
‘Knowing he did not want to return to prison, [Gilmore]
took the steps necessary to turn the job of his own
destruction over to someone else. . . . He went out of his
way to get the death penalty; that’s why he pulled two
execution-style murders he was bound to be caught for.
I think it’s a legitimate question, based on this evidence
and our knowledge of the individual, to ask if Gilmore
would have killed if there was not a death penalty in
Utah.’161
While Gilmore may be the most famous example of the
murder/suicide phenomena and of an individual relocating to a state
with the death penalty in order to improve his chances for “suicide-byState,”162 others have been inspired by Gilmore and have attempted to
procure the same results163—demonstrating that “some defendants kill
so that society will execute them.”164 Thus, the State, besides its
“normal” interest in the preservation of life and the prevention of
suicide,165 has a potentially heightened interest in preventing its system
of justice from being transformed into an “instrument of selfdestruction.”166
In addition to the preservation of life and avoidance of state-assisted
suicide, the State also possesses an interest in safeguarding the integrity
of the proceedings. As McClellan insists, “The state also has a strong
interest in ensuring that trial and sentencing are fair and that only deathdeserving defendants receive the death penalty.”167 Similarly, White
Jon Nordheimer, Death Wish Is Discerned in Poetry and Killings of Doomed Convict, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 15.
161
Id. (quoting Dr. John C. Woods, chief of forensic psychiatry at Utah State Hospital).
162
“Suicide-by-State” is akin to “‘suicide by cop’” or SBC—“an instance in which a
person attempts to commit suicide by provoking the police to use deadly force.” See, e.g.,
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000).
163
See Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95, 98, 100 (Ind. 1981). See also White, supra note 11, at
854.
164
Id. at 877.
165
See supra Part III.
166
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 840 (1975) (Burger, J., dissenting). See also White,
supra note 11, at 865 n.45 and accompanying text.
167
McClellan, supra note 26 at 216. McClellan also contends that
the death penalty is a unique, final punishment. Society does not
suffer in the same way from a defendant’s waiver of appeal in a minor
160
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contends that “society has a special interest in making sure that death
sentences are imposed only in accordance with the rule of law.
Moreover, in view of the concerns expressed in Furman v. Georgia, the
public has an interest in ensuring that the death penalty not be imposed
arbitrarily.”168
Expanding on this line of reasoning, Harrington
articulates the position that the State has
an interest in upholding the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution (which provides, among other things,
protection from cruel and unusual punishment); an
interest in ensuring that innocent persons not be
executed; an interest in ensuring the validity of the
conviction and sentence through the appellate process;
and an interest in not allowing inmates to choose their
own sentencing.169
Strafer agrees, but presents his argument slightly differently,
couching it much in the same way the Hamblen court did170—as a tension
between the State’s interests in preserving life and the integrity of the
proceedings, on the one hand, and the inmate’s right to personal
autonomy on the other. For Strafer, what tips the scales in favor of the
State’s interest,171 is that he adds factors such as the interest in protecting
felony case because the result is only a few years in prison for the
defendant. When the state executes an inmate, it does so on behalf of
all citizens of that state.
Id. at 228.
168
White, supra note 11, at 865 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). According
to White, “[t]hese [State] interests may be adequately protected without requiring every
capital defendant to oppose the death penalty.” Id.
169
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note, at 851. See generally Jeffrey Toobin,
Death in Georgia, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 32, 35 (discussing the case of Brian
Nichols, who shot and killed four people after escaping from custody at the Fulton County
Courthouse in Atlanta, GA in March 2005, his offer to plead guilty to every count in his
indictment and accept a life sentence in exchange for the district attorney’s agreement to
abandon pursuit of the death penalty, and the district attorney’s rejection of the plea offer
on the grounds that “‘[m]y belief is that punishment is a question that should be decided
by the community. It is not appropriate to kill four people and outline for the citizens what
his punishment should be. I don’t think the defendant should choose his own
punishment.’”) (quoting Fulton County district attorney Paul Howard).
170
See supra note 150. See also supra note 120–31 and accompanying text.
171
Strafer, supra note 12, at 896. Strafer concludes that “the governmental interest in
ensuring that the death penalty is administered in a constitutional manner should always
take precedence over the inmate’s ‘right to die.’” Id. Cf. Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1390–91.
Bonnie states,
I believe that the prisoner’s interest in controlling his own fate should be
subordinated to a societal interest in the integrity of the legal process
only in situations in which it is necessary to assure that the prisoner has
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the integrity of the legal profession,172 the interests of the inmate’s family
members (who frequently do not endorse the decision to volunteer),173
the “federal interest in ensuring that a particular crime is deserving of the
death penalty”174 (as distinct from an interest in ensuring that a
particular offender is deserving of the death penalty),175 and, finally, “an
interest in refusing to enforce punishments that serve no purpose.”176
This last point is particularly important to Strafer and especially
relevant to the discussion below in Part IV.B. According to Strafer,
punishment in general and the death penalty in particular serve the twin
aims of deterrence and retribution. For him, “Deterrence is not served
by executing the individual who murdered only because he wished to
die but does not have the courage to do it himself[]”177—as in the case of
the murder/suicide phenomenon. With the volunteer, the State also
does not achieve its goal of retribution: “Even the State’s interest in
retribution is diluted in the volunteer context. To the extent that
execution is sought only because the inmate considers it less painful than
life imprisonment, the State’s interests in retribution are probably better
served by requiring life imprisonment.”178 In other words, by refusing to
committed an offense for which the death penalty has been prescribed.
Indeed, I believe that the law’s duty to respect individual dignity is
heightened, not diminished, when choices are made in the shadow of
death.
Id.
Strafer, supra note 12, at 904–05. According to Strafer,
[t]he State also has an interest in protecting the integrity of the
legal profession, just as it has an interest in “the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession.” A lawyer has an ethical
obligation to intervene on his client’s behalf when “[a]ny mental or
physical condition of a client . . . renders him incapable of making a
considered judgment on his own behalf.” Allowing a condemned
inmate to waive further appeals may conflict with this ethical
obligation, particularly where the inmate initially sought to avoid the
death penalty and professes a desire to waive appeals only after a long
incarceration on death row.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
173
See id. at 895–908.
174
Id. at 902.
175
White, supra note 11, at 866 (stating that “[t]he issue of arbitrariness poses greater
problems. If capital defendants are permitted to seek their own executions, the system will
inevitably be less effective in selecting only the most heinous offenders for execution”).
176
Strafer, supra note 12, at 904 (citation omitted). See generally Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977) (stating that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if
it . . . makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”).
177
Strafer, supra note 12, at 904.
178
Id. See also West, supra note 70, at 425 (contending that the “the basic motive for
executions [is] revenge”).
172
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fight his conviction and sentence, thereby clearing the path to his
execution, the inmate removes the State’s ability to treat his death as
repayment for the crime, proportional to the harm that was caused. In so
doing, the inmate wrestles control of the meaning of his own death away
from the State179—or in Foucauldian terms, “usurp[s] the power of death
which the sovereign alone[] . . . had the right to exercise”180—an idea
explored in greater detail below.
B. Rebellious Spirits
Toward the end of the first volume of The History of Sexuality,
Foucault introduces the term “bio-power,” which he uses to refer to the
practice of modern states to regulate the conduct of their subjects as
entire populations and as individual bodies in all aspects of life,181 and
which he claims has been indispensible to the development of the
modern nation-state and capitalism.182
But for many scholars,
Foucauldian notions of power are problematic because they do not
contemplate and fail to account for opposition or resistance.183 For
example, Turner argues that “given the power of discipline and
See generally Davis, supra note 15, at 46 (arguing that “the adversarial nature of the
criminal sentencing trial has collapsed when the defendant concedes his death”).
180
FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 138.
181
Id. at 140 (“Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning
of an era of ‘bio-power.’”). See generally GARLAND, supra note 135, at 136 (describing
Foucault’s notion of how power operates in modern society—“[t]he idea now is to regulate
thoroughly and at all times rather than to repress in fits and starts”).
The term “bio-power” is closely related to the Foucauldian concept of “biopolitics” or
“biopolitical.” Foucault employs the former term more frequently, but subsequent scholars
have taken up and developed the latter. See, e.g., AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE
CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 120 (1999) (explaining that “[c]itizenship
requirements are the consequence of Foucauldian ‘biopolitics,’ in which the state regulates
the conduct of subjects as population (by age, ethnicity, occupation, and so on) and as
individuals (sexual and reproductive behavior) so as to ensure security and prosperity for
the nation as a whole”).
Margaret Lock and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, medical
anthropologists whom the author of this Article cites at various junctures throughout this
Article, use the term “body politic” to refer to “regulation, surveillance, and control of
bodies (individual and collective) in reproduction and sexuality, work, leisure, and
sickness.” Margaret Lock & Nancy Scheper-Hughes, A Critical-Interpretive Approach in
Medical Anthropology: Rituals and Routines of Discipline and Dissent, in READINGS FOR A
HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 486, 489 (Paul A. Erickson & Liam D. Murphy,
eds., 1990).
182
FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 94–95.
183
This is not to suggest that criticisms of Foucault are limited to issues of power and
resistance. For example, Ozawa-de Silva criticized Foucault on the grounds that his
“extensive discussion of the body still leaves the ‘body’ as a rather abstract entity rather
than focusing more closely on specific aspects of embodied experience.” OZAWA-DE SILVA,
supra note 88, at 34.
179
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surveillance, it is difficult to know how one would explain or locate
opposition, resistance[,] and criticism to medical (or any other form of)
dominance.”184 Similarly, Garland contends that:
Foucault’s tendency to discuss the spread of discipline
as if it were politically unopposed is a serious deficiency
in his account. . . . [I]t ignores all the forces which
operate to restrain the disciplinary impulse and to
protect liberties. What is in fact a description of the
control potential possessed by modern power-knowledge
technologies is presented as if it were the reality of their
present-day operation. It is a worst-case scenario which
ignores the strength of countervailing forces.185
Hardt and Negri take a different tack. Rather than critiquing
Foucault per se, they build on his concept of “bio-power,” claiming that
some acts, such as suicide bombings, function as essentially the
“opposite of biopower” or challenge the pervasiveness and omnipotence
of bio-power by using life and body as weapons:
A sovereign power is always two-sided: a dominating
power always relies on the consent or submission of the
dominated. The power of sovereignty is thus always
limited, and this limit can always potentially be
transformed into resistance, a point of vulnerability, a
threat. The suicide bomber appears here . . . as a symbol
of the inevitable limitation and vulnerability of
sovereign power; refusing to accept a life of submission,
the suicide bomber turns life into a horrible weapon.
This is the ontological limit of biopower in its most magic and
revolting form.186

TURNER, supra note 15, at 14.
GARLAND, supra note 135, at 167–68. To his credit, Foucault does mention
“resistance.” But it is a dim view of resistance: “Where there is power, there is resistance,
and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
relation to power.” FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 95. As Knauft explains, “Foucault suggests
that resisting this power is particularly difficult; what seems to be opposition against
power or authority is often just a superficial reshuffling of terms or allegiances at the level
of content.”
BRUCE M. KNAUFT, GENEALOGIES FOR THE PRESENT:
CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 142 (1996). See also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE
45–61 (1984) (critiquing Foucault for failing to consider the role of tactical resistance in
practices of everyday life).
186
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 31, at 54.
184
185
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Later on, they expound:
Once we recognize sovereignty as a dynamic two-sided
relationship [between rulers and ruled] we can begin to
recognize the contradictions that continually appear
within sovereignty. Consider, first of all, the modern
military figure of sovereignty, that is, the power to
decide over the life and death of subjects. The constant
development of technologies of mass destruction
throughout the modern era arriving finally at nuclear
weapons has . . . made this prerogative of sovereignty
approach something absolute.
The sovereign in
possession of nuclear weapons rules almost completely
over death. Even this seemingly absolute power,
however, is radically thrown into question by practices
that refuse the control over life, such as, for example,
suicidal actions, from the protest of the Buddhist monk
who sets himself on fire to the terrorist suicide bomber.
When life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge
sovereignty, the power over life and death that the
sovereign exercises becomes useless. The absolute
weapons against bodies are neutralized by the voluntary
and absolute negation of the body. Furthermore, the
death of subjects in general undermines the power of the
sovereign: without the subjects[,] the sovereign rules
not over society but an empty wasteland. The exercise
of this absolute sovereignty becomes contradictory with
sovereignty itself.187
In light of these observations, one could suggest that the volunteer
can and may function as an opposite of or in opposition to bio-power—as a
“rebellious spirit.” Clearly, not every volunteer does or would, and the
determination would depend in part on the intent of the condemned
prisoner wishing to waive or withdraw his appeals. For example, the
death row inmate who can no longer tolerate the dehumanizing
conditions of most death row facilities or who experiences severe
depression or who possesses pre-existing suicidal urges that nonetheless
do not prevent his understanding his legal position and the options
available to him probably would not be regarded as stretching the
“ontological limits of biopower.”188 On the other hand, the prisoner who
187
188
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wishes to “escape the roller-coaster experience of the habeas appeals
process or to seize control over it,” or who indicates a desire for a
“‘macho’ confrontation with death,”189 or who positions his volunteering
as a rebuff to the State might well be considered a symbol of the
inevitable limitation and vulnerability of sovereign or State power.
Certainly, the volunteer in the death penalty context—the individual
who waives or withdraws his appeals—does not transform his body into
the same type of weapon as the suicide bomber, whose circumstances
and political (and potentially religious) motivations are different,190
whose actions may carry distinct cultural currency,191 and who may
cause dozens of deaths along with his own.192 But his actions may well
merit inclusion in a (broad) discussion that includes both suicide
bombers and individuals engaging in hunger strikes or self-immolation.
To explicate, it might be useful to consider Wee’s conception of an
“extreme communicative act” (“ECA”)—a term he employs to refer to
nonlinguistic communicative acts that are “typically associated with
See supra text accompanying note 106.
The author of this Article is indebted to Moyukh Chatterjee for pointing this out.
191
That suicide and suicide bombing each hold divergent and culturally-specific
meanings should not be overlooked. See JACK D. DOUGLAS, THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF
SUICIDE (1967). See generally Mark Halsey, Against ‘Green’ Criminology, 44 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 833, 841 n.9 (2004) (explaining that “[m]achines of axiomisation (e.g. the law
machine) will tend toward the former [permanent and natural,] whereas machines of
absolute decoding (e.g. the terrorist machine) tend toward the latter [contestable and
reworkable ]”). See generally LOCK, supra note 15, at 195. Halsey describes how
Japan is a society acutely sensitive to the way in which the social order
may be contested through death practices. Ritual suicides by samurai,
generals, unrequited lovers, and famous authors are feted as part of
Japan’s tradition, both inside the country and outside it. Taking one’s
life to make a statement about the condition of society, or the worth of a
cause, or alternatively about a perceived failure of self or another to
meet society’s expectations, are long-standing practices in Japan.
Halsey, supra note 191, at 841 n.9. See also Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, The
Guidebook for Taking a Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at § 4:1, 3 (discussing the “jihad
etiquette”—the unwritten set of “rules” that guide and justify the killing that militants
commit); Ozawa-de Silva, supra note 80 (pointing out that “[i]n Japan . . . one of the
dominant features in the rhetoric of suicide has been cultural anesthetization, whereby
certain suicides are given a positive cultural valence” (citations omitted)); Suicide: Elusive,
But Not Always Unstoppable, ECONOMIST 63, 63 (June 23, 2007) (explaining that “Japan is a
conformist society, and life, it is said, is bleak for those who do not fit in. It has a tradition
of self-killing, which in some forms, such as the ritualised seppuku (‘belly-cutting’) of the
samurai, may still be deemed honourable, even noble.”); cf. Kim Gamel, Teens Forced To Be
Human Bombs, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 27, 2008, at A3 (describing weeping
teenagers claiming to have been forced into training for suicide bombings by Saudi
militants in Iraq).
192
Death penalty volunteers (with the exception of situations such as Gilmore’s) are also
less likely to attract the same level of media attention as suicide bombers. See generally
Stephen Holden, Learning To Empathize with a Suicide Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at B5.
189
190
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protests, particularly in the context of a lengthy political
struggle[,] . . . occur ‘late’ in the interactional sequence, that is, after a
number of less dramatic expressions of protest have already been
employed[,] and . . . involve some form of self-inflicted harm, which can
sometimes be fatal.”193 Wee’s primary example involves politicallyoriented or politically-inspired hunger strikes and acts of selfimmolation.194 Given that the volunteer does not possess a commitment
to a specific, prior political position (although one may regard his
crime(s) in political terms, i.e., as a comment on class structure or socioeconomic status) and lacks allegiance to a broader political cause
(although the volunteer may come to regard himself as part of a larger
confederacy of death row inmates opposing the State), the analogy is not
perfect.195 And there may also be some issue with the fact that Wee
considers it crucial that the acts be “self-inflicted since they are intended
to express the strength of the actors’ own commitment to a specific
position.”196 But the “close relation[ship] between ECAs and the notion
of martyrdom”197 and the “assymetrical power relationship where the
actor who engages in an ECA is in the position of lesser power”198—both
relevant in the context of waiver and withdrawal of death penalty
appeals—help illustrate how the volunteer may not be a “docile body” in
either normative or Foucauldian terms, but a “rebellious spirit”
undermining the power of the State.
How does the volunteer work to subvert the power of the State? The
initial and most obvious way has already been noted: by challenging
State interests in the preservation of life and the prevention of suicide, as
well as the State’s desire to forestall the murder/suicide phenomena and
Lionel Wee, ‘Extreme Communicative Acts’ and the Boosting of Illocutionary Force, 36 J.
PRAGMATICS 2161, 2162–163 (2004).
194
See id. See also Lionel Wee, The Hunger Strike as a Communicative Act: Intention Without
Responsibility, 17 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 63 (2007).
195
See Wee, supra note 193, at 2171. Wee explains:
While all the ECAs are aimed at expressing the strength of the actors’
commitment to specific positions, in both the IRA and Kurdish
examples, the ECAs seem to be further prompted by the desire to
actually achieve a particular goal by getting somebody to do something
(e.g., to grant political status to the IRA prisoners or to grant political
asylum to a Kurdish rebel leader).
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 2172.
198
Id. at 2173. See generally Michiel Leezenberg, Power in Communication: Implications for
the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface, 34 J. PRAGMATICS 893, 898 (2002) (contending “that the
efficacy of, say, performative language[,] cannot be wholly characterized in terms of the
powers conventionally associated with words, but also depends on the power or status
function conferred on the person uttering them”).
193
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safeguard the integrity of criminal proceedings and the legal profession.
But in addition to thwarting State efforts to dictate the conditions and
meaning of death, the volunteer may be considered a rebellious spirit in
a less dramatic, albeit no less significant, way.
According to Nugent, the State’s “unending iterative productions—
its everyday bureaucratic routines, its formulaic documentary practices,
and its magnificent public rituals—establish for it a seemingly neutral,
objective vantage point that stands ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the social order,
watching, preserving, safeguarding.”199 Through its “endless production
and circulation of documents,” Nugent continues, the State “never
stop[s] talking.”200 Applying Nugent’s contentions regarding the State to
situations involving capital defendants, one could argue that the State
benefits not so much from the execution, but from the lengthy death
penalty litigation process. In this light, the “docile body”—the “useful”
death row inmate—is not the one whom the State can execute when it is
convenient and necessary as a symbol of State power, but all death row
inmates who help establish the State’s ongoing claim to authority
through its endless production and circulation of briefs, motions, and
opinions. In this way, “volunteering” could serve as an act of resistance
or opposition to bio-power not by undermining the power of the
sovereign when the State does not wish to flex its muscle—by beating
the State to the punch, so to speak—but by effectively shutting the State
up—by (prematurely) ending the conversation and doing so on the
inmate’s own terms.

199
David Nugent, Dark Fantasies of State: Notes from the Peruvian Underground (Draft)
(presented at “Off-Centered States: Political Formation and Deformation in the Andes,”
Institute for Comparative and International Studies, Emory University) (Sept. 28–29, 2007)
(manuscript on file with author).
200
Id. at 21. See also Shannon Speed, Exercising Rights and Reconfiguring Resistance in the
Zapatista Juntas de Buen Gobierno, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 163, 178 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds.,
2007) (suggesting that pursuing social struggle by petitioning the state through the legal
system for the establishment of ‘rights’ may serve to buttress the neoliberal state’s role as
the purveyor and protector of rights, and as upholder of ‘law and order.’”). See generally
Jean E. Jackson, Rights to Indigenous Culture in Colombia, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 204, 229 (Mark Goodale &
Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007) (contending that “the state is not a unitary center of power,
but in fact is composed of institutions like legislatures and judiciaries whose individual
actors engage in discourses and practices of power, the multiple effects of which give the
appearance of a state”) (citing JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE:
HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (2003); Maddening States, 32 ANN. R. ANTHROPOLOGY 393–410 (2001);
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close
Encounters of the Deceptive Kind, 42 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 125, 125–38 (2001)).
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V. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article has attempted to set forth a conceptual framework with
which to understand the power dynamics that exist between the State
and the condemned prisoner wishing to waive or withdraw his death
penalty appeals. Using Foucauldian notions of discipline and bio-power,
as well as Hardt and Negri’s formulation of an “opposite” of bio-power,
this Article has considered the motivations of the volunteer and the
interests of the State and then classified the volunteer as either a “docile
body” or a “rebellious spirit.” Admittedly, the presentation of the
options is quite stark. But the intent has not been to exclude the
potential for a continuum (or even a non-Foucauldian contemplation of
volunteering). Rather, the goal has been to offer a starting point for
understanding who ultimately controls the body of the condemned, and
to offer an instrument for exploring and contemplating the continued
rationale for the death penalty and the purpose it may serve as a social
phenomenon.
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, death penalty
jurisprudence in the United States is at a critical juncture. Although Baze
did not directly address the issue of volunteering for execution, the
outcome of the case may well affect the waiver and withdrawal of death
penalty appeals. Had the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits methods of execution that create an “unnecessary
risk of pain and suffering”—effectively requiring a new method of lethal
injection—more death row inmates might now be volunteering because
of the perception that the new method(s) will cause less pain.201 But such
a ruling could also have resulted in fewer volunteers if the language of
the opinion had suggested that abolition might be forthcoming. As it
turned out, the Supreme Court’s holding sanctions the existing
cocktail.202 Some individuals on death row have continued to press their
appeals.203 Others, such as David Mark Hill (executed on June 6, 2008)
and Marco Allen Chapman (executed on November 21, 2008) have

201
See Essig, supra note 2, at WK15. According to one commentator, a new cocktail
would serve as no guarantee of pain-free executions. Id. “[D]ecades of executions have
taught us this: Technical systems are prone to failure, and human bodies are irreducibly
complex and idiosyncratic. Whatever the technique, executions will go horrifyingly
wrong.” Id.
202
Such a holding, by no means, requires states to use the existing cocktail. In the
aftermath of Baze, states are free to continue to do so or to come up with a newer, less
painful method.
203
See, e.g., Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Inmate Says He’s Too Fat For Execution (Aug. 5,
2008), http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080804/ap_on_re_us/death_penalty_cooey (last
visited Aug. 11, 2008).
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waived their appeals.204 (Michael Rodriguez labored for more than a
year to convince courts that he was competent to drop his appeals;205 he
was finally executed on August 14, 2008.206) Still others, seeking a
“macho confrontation with death”207 might volunteer, knowing that
doing so would generate some element of publicity and prestige—
especially in light of the Court’s decision. Additional research will be
needed to understand the impact of Baze on the waiver and withdrawal
of death penalty appeals.
Perhaps more significant than couching the issue of death penalty
volunteering in the context of Baze, this Article, using the issue of waiver
and withdrawal of death penalty appeals as a domain through which
meanings, practice, identities, and relations are defined and contested,
has attempted to set forth a conceptual framework with which to
understand the power dynamics that exist between the death row inmate
and the State. While the focus of this Article has clearly been on the
ways in which death penalty volunteering affects those power relations
between the condemned prisoner and the State, it speaks to and is part of
broader social processes and issues of power, including the place of
capital punishment in a wider socio-political network.208 As OhnukiTierney acknowledges, “[t]here have always been culturally sanctioned
ways of terminating human life, including wars and other purposeful
killings.”209 Additional avenues of inquiry are needed to help shed light
on the death penalty’s role in contemporary society210—essentially, the
“what” or “why” of power in contrast to Foucault’s epistemic “how.”211

Associated Press, National Briefing—South: South Carolina: Killer Is Executed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A12; Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
205
Michael Graczyk, Texas 7 Member Volunteers for Execution this Week, YAHOO! NEWS
(Aug. 10, 2008), http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080810/ap_on_re_us/texas7_execution&
printer=1;_ylt=AlbN_d0flgNXlP2UCChT38lH2ocA.
206
See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Dec. 08. 2007).
207
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 12, at 850.
208
This type of approach is well-articulated by David Garland. See GARLAND, supra note
135, at 3–22. For a recent evolutionary perspective on why people punish and how
punishment becomes established within populations, see Robert Boyd & Sarah Matthew, A
Narrow Road to Cooperation, 316 SCI. 1858, 1858–59 (2007).
209
Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 15, at 239. See also Kalervo Oberg, Crime and Punishment in
Tlingit Society, 36 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 145, 145–56 (1934); Keith F. Otterbein, On
Reconsidering Violence in Simple Human Societies, 29 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 633, 635
(1988); Paredes, supra note 145, at 16 (referring to capital punishment as a “cross-cultural
universal”).
210
For example, one might consider Solomon’s contention that “capital punishment
legitimizes killing as a way to deal with problems.” Solomon, supra note 150, at 443.
211
KNAUFT, supra note 185, at 157.
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For example, as this Article has noted, in the United States the trend
has been to move away from painful executions. As Essig recently
remarked:
It was only in the 1850s or so that Americans became
squeamish about the pain suffered by executed
prisoners. Before that, pain wasn’t a problem; it was the
point. Through drawing and quartering, beheading,
shooting[,] or hanging, the state inscribed its power on
the body of the convict and provided a lesson in the
perils of disobedience.212
Similarly, Weil has mused:
The history of capital punishment in the United
States has been filled with a peripatetic search for a
method of killing that doesn’t offend a blood-thirsty, yet
tough-on-crime, yet squeamish public. Nooses, if the
drop is too short, leave bodies twitching; if the drop is
too long, heads pop off. Electric chairs result in horrible
odors and burns. Firing squads are too violent. Gas
chambers take too long and are too grotesque. (One
1992 lethal gas execution in Arizona caused an attorney
general to throw up and a warden to threaten to quit if
he had to execute by that method again.)213
Gradually, overt fetishistic fascinations with painful, bloody
punishment and executions have given way to a preference for quiet,

Essig, supra note 2, at WK15. See generally Edward Lewine, Bitter Pill, NEW YORK
TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Dec. 2, 2007, at 68 (reviewing HAROLD SCHECHTER, THE DEVIL’S
GENTLEMAN: PRIVILEGE, POISON, AND THE TRIAL THAT USHERED IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (2008)) (asking “Who knew . . . that the 19th century had a very different crime
obsession than we do now?”).
213
Weil, supra note 1, at WK3. See also Essig, supra note 2, at WK15 (“Starting in the
1850s, such sensitivities [to prisoner pain and prolonged suffering] gave rise first to
improved hanging methods and later to the electric chair, the gas chamber[,] and lethal
injection. Each method was promoted as less painful for the prisoner and less emotionally
fraught for those who watch.”). See generally Theo Emery, Tennessee, After Review, Sets
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A19 (reporting that “Florida suspended executions
late last year after it took 34 minutes for an inmate to die, and Ohio re-examined its
procedures after it took 90 minutes to put an inmate to death last May”); Friend, supra note
56, at 70 (explaining that some regarded the execution of Stanley “Tookie” Williams,
founder of the Crips and later nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his helping to
broker gang truces, as a “prolonged ‘torture-murder’”).
212
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antiseptic, and comparatively private capital punishment.214 Or so it
seems. Despite questions as to whether the death penalty does indeed
deter violent crimes,215 American society has been unwilling to part with
capital punishment—for the “alleged social benefits [of] retributive
justice and deterrence[.]”216 If American society genuinely rejects
gruesome displays of prolonged pain and agony experienced by bodies
suffering unspeakable pain and if there exists serious doubts about the
alleged social benefits,217 one must ask why the death penalty has
continued to persevere.218 Some commentators speculate that “the new
focus on terrorism in the United States . . . [has] helped to keep the
federal death penalty alive and public opinion about capital punishment
in an ambivalent state.”219 While this is certainly a possibility—for

214
See generally Adam Liptak, Florida Panel Urges Steps for Painless Executions, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2007, at A12 (“Opponents of the paralytic chemical [used in lethal injection] say it
serves no legitimate purpose and may mask agonizing pain. But corrections officials say
using other methods would take too long and could subject witnesses to discomfort.”).
215
Compare James R. Acker, Impose an Immediate Moratorium on Executions, 6 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 641, 645 (2007) (calling into question “the utility of capital punishment,
including its efficacy in deterring murder,” and pointing to findings that “strongly suggest
that capital punishment is not a superior deterrent to murder than is life imprisonment”),
and Burr, supra note 40, at 14 (stating that
we can show that over the years in which the death penalty has been
with us, it has never been demonstrated to deter violent crimes. At
best, it has no effect—at worst, by sanctioning the deliberate killing of
one another, it encourages homicide. . . . The death penalty is not a
deterrent to violent crime.
), and Paredes and Purdum, supra note 79, at 9 (ruminating that “capital punishment does
no more to deter crime than the rituals of Tenochtitlan did to keep the sun in the sky[]”),
with Reuben M. Greenberg, Race, the Criminal Justice System, and Community-Oriented
Policing, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 400 (1997) (“In reality, no one knows for certain
whether the death penalty is a deterrent. However, common sense suggests that it might
be, and the need to protect the public from the most vicious offendors [sic] justifies taking
this punitive action.”), and Adam Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 1, 24 (reporting on recent studies that have found that the death
penalty prevents murders), and Jeremy W. Peters, Move To Repeal Death Penalty in New
Jersey, Where It’s Mainly Academic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A24 (same).
216
Essig, supra note 2, at WK15. See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life
Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1112 n.3 (noting the importance of the societal goals of
retribution and deterrence).
217
But see Greenberg, supra note 214, at 400; Liptak, supra note 214, at 24; Peters, supra
note 214, at A24.
218
See Otterbein, supra note 209, at 635. According to at least one anthropologist, “capital
punishment is found in all or nearly all societies[.]” Id.
219
KUDLAC, supra note 7, at xvi. According to Kudlac,
[b]y 1994, growing opposition to the death penalty was becoming
visible across the country.
The Oklahoma City bombing and
subsequent arrest of Timothy McVeigh in 1995 arguably affected this
trend by reinvigorating many people’s support for capital punishment.
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“[p]unishment . . . is not reducible to a single meaning or a single
purpose”220—the author of this Article is cautious of “instrumental,
punishment-as-crime-control conception[s.]”221 Instead, this author
questions whether secret and (albeit somewhat attenuated) sadistic
pleasures may still permeate the collective subconscious—pleasures that
may be better understood through an examination of public interest in
the “bifurcated spectacle” of trial (and sentencing) on the one hand and
execution on the other,222 as well as through the continued study of the
growth and popularity of violent forms of entertainment (television
shows, including news programs, movies, and video games).223 Future
In addition, the new threat of terrorism was used to justify the
continued practice of the death penalty.
Id. at xv.
220
GARLAND, supra note 135, at 17.
221
Id. at 19.
222
See Kai T. Erikson, Notes on the Sociology of Deviance, 9 SOC. PROBS. 307, 310 (1962) (
In an earlier day, correction of deviant offenders took place in the
public market and gave the crowd a chance to display its interest in a
direct, active way. In our own day, the guilty are no longer paraded in
public places, but instead we are confronted by a heavy flow of
newspaper and radio reports which offer much the same kind of
entertainment.
). See generally Jeff Ferrell, Criminalizing Popular Culture, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, AND
JUSTICE 71, 71–83 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998) (describing the role of the
mass media in presenting, re-presenting, and constructing criminality); KUDLAC, supra note
7, at 102 (describing how in the cases of Bundy, Gacy, Wuornos, and Tucker, “[o]nce the
verdict was rendered, the case dropped out of the headlines until an announcement of a
scheduled execution date. The media typically ignores the correctional system.”). Cf.
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 9 (asserting that “the publicity has shifted to the trial, and to
the sentence; the execution itself is like an additional shame that justice is ashamed to
impose on the condemned man[]”).
223
See Geoffrey Gorer, The Pornography of Death, reprinted in GEOFFREY GORER, DEATH,
GRIEF, AND MOURNING 192, 197 (1965). This inquiry itself is by no means new. See id. More
than fifty years ago, George Gorer argued that “violent death has played an ever-growing
part in the fantasies offered to mass audiences—detective stories, thrillers, Westerns, war
stories, spy stories, science fiction, and eventually horror comics.” Id.
For examples of scholarly inquiries into, and analysis of, media constructions and
depictions of crime, including local and national newspaper coverage of crime and crime
control, as well as the portrayal and production of crime, criminals, justice, juvenile
delinquency, and violence in film, television, cyberspace, popular music, comic books and
other popular culture texts, see CHARLES R. ACLAND, YOUTH, MURDER, SPECTACLE: THE
CULTURAL POLITICS OF “YOUTH IN CRISIS” (1995); Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale,
Popular Culture, Crime, and Justice, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 1, 1–20 (Frankie
Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); MEDIA, PROCESS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
CRIME: STUDIES IN NEWSMAKING CRIMINOLOGY (Gregg Barak ed., 1994); Gregg Barak,
Media, Crime, and Justice: A Case for Constitutive Criminology, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY
142, 142–66 (Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); REPRESENTING O.J.: MURDER,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MASS CULTURE (Gregg Barak ed., 1996); Henry H. Brownstein, The
Media and the Construction of Random Drug Violence, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 45, 45–65
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(Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); Derral Cheatwood, Prison Movies: Films About
Adult, Male, Civilian Prisons: 1929–1995, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 209, 209–31
(Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); STEVEN M. CHERMAK, VICTIMS IN THE NEWS:
CRIME AND THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA (1995); Steven M. Chermak, The Presentation of
Drugs in the News Media: The News Sources Involves in the Construction of Social Problems, 14
JUST. Q. 687, 687–718 (1997); Steven M. Chermak, Police, Courts, and Corrections in the Media,
in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 87, 87–99 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds.,
1998); STEVE CHIBNALL, LAW AND ORDER NEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF CRIME REPORTING IN THE
BRITISH PRESS (1977); THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS: DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND THE
MASS MEDIA (Stanley Cohen & Jock Young eds., 1973); ENTERTAINING CRIME: TELEVISION
REALITY PROGRAMS (Gray Cavendar & Mark Fishman eds., 1998); C. Greek, O.J. and The
Internet: The First Cybertrial, in REPRESENTING O.J.: MURDER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MASS
CULTURE 64, 64–77 (Gregg Barak ed., 1996); STUART HALL, ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS:
MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978); A. Howe, The War Against Women:
Media Representations of Men’s Violence Against Women in Australia, 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 59, 59–75 (1997); PHILLIP JENKINS, USING MURDER: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SERIAL HOMICIDE (1994); David Kidd-Hewitt, Crime and the media: A Criminological
Perspective, in CRIME AND THE MEDIA: THE POST-MODERN SPECTACLE 1, 1–24 (David KiddHewitt & Richard Osborne eds., 1995); PAUL KOOISTRA, CRIMINALS AS HEROES: STRUCTURE,
POWER, AND IDENTITY (1989); Gary T. Marx, Electric Eye in the Sky: Some Reflections on the
New Surveillance and Popular Culture, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 106, 106–41 (Jeff Ferrell &
Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); Graeme Newman, Popular Culture and Violence: Decoding the
Violence of Popular Movies, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 40, 40–56 (Frankie Y.
Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); Jeffrey Niesel, The Horror of Everyday Life: Taxidermy,
Aesthetics, and Consumption in Horror Films, in INTERROGATING POPULAR CULTURE:
DEVIANCE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ORDER 16, 16–31 (Sean E. Anderson & Gregory J. Howard
eds., 1998); Amy Kiste Nyberg, Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency: A Historical
Perspective, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 61, 61–70 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C.
Hale eds., 1998); P.A. Perrone & Meda Chesney-Lind, Representations of Gangs and
Delinquency: Wild in the Streets, 24 SOC. JUST. 96, 96–116 (1997); David P. Phillips, The Impact
of Mass Media Violence on U.S. Homicide, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 560. 560–68 (1983); NEIL POSTMAN,
AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOWBUSINESS (1986);
CONSTRUCTING CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ON MAKING NEWS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (Gary W.
Potter & Victor E. Kappeler, eds., 2006); C. Reinarman & C. Duskin, Dominant Ideology and
Drugs in the Media, 3 INTERN. J. DRUG POL. 6, 6–15 (1992); Clinton R. Sanders & Eleanor
Lyon, Repetitive Retribution: Media Images and the Cultural Construction of Criminal Justice, in
CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 25, 25–44 (Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); RICHARD
SPARKS, TELEVISION AND THE DRAMA OF CRIME: MORAL TALES AND THE PLACE OF CRIME IN
PUBLIC LIFE (1992); Richard Sparks, Entertaining the Crisis: Television and Moral Enterprise, in
CRIME AND THE MEDIA: THE POST-MODERN SPECTACLE 49, 49–66 (David Kidd-Hewitt &
Richard Osborne eds., 1995); RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES
AND REALITIES (1998); Sara Thornton, Moral Panic, The Media, and British Rave Culture, in
ALAN ROSS & TRICIA ROSE, MICROPHONE FIENDS: YOUTH MUSIC AND YOUTH CULTURE 176,
176–92 (1994); Kenneth D. Tunnell, Reflections on Crime, Criminals, and Control in
Newsmagazine Television Programs, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 100, 100–10
(Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); Neil Websdale & Alexander Alvarez,
Forensic Journalism as Patriarchal Ideology: The Newspaper Construction of Homicide-Suicide, in
POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 123, 123–41 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds.,
1998); and Jeff Williams, Comics: A Tool of Subversion, in INTERROGATING POPULAR
CULTURE: DEVIANCE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ORDER 97, 97–115 (Sean E. Anderson & Gregory
J. Howard eds., 1998). Even Foucault himself suggested that “[i]t is the criminal . . . that is
needed by the press and public opinion.” FOUCAULT, supra note 137, at 432. See Jeff
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inquiries might well consider whether “the gloomy festival of
punishment”224 has indeed died out—whether “[p]unishment [has, in
fact,] gradually ceased to be a spectacle[]”225—or whether its “visible
intensity” has just been transformed.

Ferrell, Cultural Criminology, 25 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 395, 397, 408 (1999). More recently, Jeff
Ferrell has explored the “spectacle and carnival of crime[]” and the ways in which “the
mass media constructs crime as entertainment[.]” Id. at 408; see id. at 407, 408–09, 411. See
also Simon Hallsworth, It’s Good To Watch: Cruelty, Transgression and Popular Culture, (Paper
presented at On the Edge: Transgression and The Dangerous Other: An Interdisciplinary
Conference, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center, City University
of New York) (Aug. 9, 2007) (on file with author). Simon Hallsworth has made continued
progress in revealing and explaining the ways in which various groups produce and
consume images of crime—especially with respect to how television crime dramas affect
the production and perception of crime and policing imagery. Id.
The author of this Article would encourage further investigations into how crime is
depicted and portrayed by various media and the ways in which crime, crime news, and
crime entertainment have become entangled and blurred. But the author of this Article
would urge specific focus on depictions of torture in recent horror movies (such as the Saw
series, Untraceable (Cohen/Pearl Productions 2008), The Texas Chainsaw Massacre: The
Beginning (New Line 2006)) and inquiries into whether these films—these “hundreds of
tiny theatres of punishment”—have replaced the (pleasure derived from the) spectacles of
execution from yesteryear. See FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 113. See also Stanley Cohen, The
Punitive City: Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control, 3 CONTEMP. CRISES 339, 359 (1979).
224
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 8.
225
Id. at 9. See also Anton Blok, The Symbolic Vocabulary of Public Executions, in HISTORY
AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31, 46–52
(June Starr and Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) (discussing the decline of the “[t]heater of
[p]unishments”).
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